A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy by Rudstein, David S.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 8
A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee
Against Double Jeopardy
David S. Rudstein
Copyright c 2005 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 14 Wm.
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 193 (2005), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol14/iss1/8
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
GUARANTEE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY*
David S. Rudstein**
INTRODUCTION
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."' This constitutional guarantee encompasses several related protections.
First, it bars the government2 from prosecuting a person a second time for the same
* Adapted from DAvID S. RUDSTEIN, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNrrED STATES CONSTITuTIoN (2004). Reproduced with permission of Greenwood Publishing
Group, Inc., Westport, CT.
** Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.M., University of Illinois, 1975; J.D., Northwestern University, 1971; B.S., University
of Illinois, 1968.
l U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 Under the so-called "dual sovereignty" doctrine, two separate sovereigns, such as two
states or the federal government and a state, can each prosecute an individual for the same
act without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541
U.S. 193, 197,210 (2004) (holding that a conviction in an Indian tribal court of a non-tribal
member Indian for "violence to a policeman" did not bar a subsequent federal prosecution
for assaulting a federal officer); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1985) (holding that
an Alabama prosecution for "murder during a kidnaping" was not barred by a previous
Georgia conviction for murder); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978)
(holding that a federal prosecution of an Indian for statutory rape was not barred by a
previous conviction in an Indian tribal court for the lesser-included offense of contributing
to the delinquency of a minor); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959) (holding
that a federal prosecution for conspiracy to destroy telephone company property was not
barred by a previous Illinois conviction for conspiring to injure or destroy property of
another); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (holding that a federal prose-
cution for manufacturing, transporting, and possessing intoxicating liquor was not barred by
previous Washington convictions for manufacturing, transporting, and possessing liquor);
see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 139 (1959) (holding that, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an Illinois prosecution for armed robbery was not
barred by a previous federal acquittal on a charge of robbing a federally insured savings and
loan institution). The Supreme Court reasons that a crime constitutes an offense against the
sovereignty of the government, so "[w]hen a defendant in a single act violates the 'peace and
dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct
'offences."' Heath, 474 U.S. at 88 (citations omitted).
Over the years, many judges and scholars have criticized the dual sovereignty doctrine.
See, e.g., id. at 98-101 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (as applied in the federal-state context);
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offense after he has already been tried and acquitted.3 Second, it prohibits the
government from prosecuting a person a second time for the same offense after he
has already been convicted.4 Third, it forbids the government from imposing
multiple punishments upon a person for the same offense in successive proceedings.5
Finally, in some circumstances, it bars the government from prosecuting a person
a second time for the same offense after a judge prematurely terminated his first
Abbate, 359 U.S. at 202-03 (Black, J., dissenting); Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155-64 (Black, J.,
dissenting); United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483,497-99 (2d Cir.
1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (questioning Heath, 474 U.S. 82, Abbate, 359 U.S. 187,
and Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121); Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law
After Rodney King, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 4-27 (1995); J.A.C. Grant, The Lanza Rule of
Successive Prosecutions, 32 CoLUM. L. REv. 1309, 1319-28 (1932); Sandra Guerra, The
Myth ofDual Sovereignty: MultijurisdictionalDrug Law Enforcement andDouble Jeopardy,
73 N.C.L.REv. 1159, 1209-10 (1995); George C. Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double
Jeopardy: A Critique ofBartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 700, 704-05 (1963); Robert Matz, Note, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy
Clause: Ifat First You Don't Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 3 67-76
(1997).
3 E.g., Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005); Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S.
140 (1986); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970); Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per
curiam); Greenv. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Kepnerv. United States, 195 U.S. 100
(1904); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); see also Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430,446 (1981) (holding that the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment at a trial-like
capital sentencing proceeding bars a subsequent capital sentencing proceeding for the same
offense); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (holding that an appellate court's rever-
sal of a conviction because the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury's
verdict bars a subsequent trial for the same offense); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444-45
(1970) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel
so that an acquittal of one offense can bar a subsequent prosecution for a related offense).
' E.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682
(1977) (per curiam); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); Exparte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176
(1889).
' Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
366 (1983); see also Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994)
(holding that a "drug tax" assessed after a conviction violates double jeopardy); North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969) (holding that "punishment already exacted
must be fully 'credited' upon re-conviction), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). But see Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 407 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I adhere to my view that 'the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits successive prosecution, not successive punishment."' (citation omitted)).
With respect to multiple punishments for the same offense in a single trial, "the Double
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended." Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366.
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trial, either by declaring a mistrial6 or by dismissing the charge against him before
the fact-finder reached a verdict in the case.7
The overall design of the Double Jeopardy Clause was perhaps best expressed
by the Supreme Court in Green v. United States.8 Writing for the majority, Justice
Hugo L. Black stated:
The constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy"
was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to
the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for
an alleged offense.... The underlying idea, one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurispru-
dence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individ-
ual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.9
In recent years, courts and jurists have considered the protection against being
placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense to be a fundamental right.' The
Supreme Court of the United States in Benton v. Maryland" stated that "[t]he funda-
mental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted."' 2 A
6 See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (declaring mistrial sua sponte so
the Government's witnesses could consult with attorneys about their constitutional rights);
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (declaring mistrial at the Government's
request, and over the defendant's objection, because the Government's key witness was not
present).
' E.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99-100 (1978) (holding that the defendant
could be tried twice for the same crime, but indicating that in some cases a retrial would be
barred); United States v. Govro, 833 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding double jeopardy
did exist and the defendant could not be tried twice for the same crime).
8 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
9 Id. at 187-88.
1" See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. But see MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 228 (1936) (stating that the principle against placing a
person in double jeopardy "is not now an accepted doctrine in Continental systems"); JAY
A. SIGLER, DOuBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 4 (1969)
(concluding that it is likely that "double jeopardy was not so fundamental a privilege" in
early English law). See generally Jill Hunter, The Development of the Rule Against Double
Jeopardy, 5 J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 3 (1984) (questioning the fundamentality of the principle).
" 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
12 ldat 795.
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dozen years earlier, Justice Felix Frankfurter called the protection "an indispensable
requirement of a civilized criminal procedure."' 3 Justice Ivan Rand of the Supreme
Court of Canada made a similar claim, maintaining that this "cardinal principle" lies
"[a]t the foundation of criminal law."' 4 One prominent scholar believes that "[n]o
other procedural doctrine is more fundamental or all-pervasive."' 5
This article will explore the sources of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy and trace its history through its incorporation into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. ORIGINS OF THE GUARANTEE
The precise origins of the guarantee against double jeopardy are unclear. Early
in the twentieth century, one American court declared that the doctrine "seems to
have been always embedded in the common law of England, as well as in the
Roman law, and doubtless in every other system of jurisprudence, and, instead of
having a specific origin, it simply always existed."' 6 This claim certainly is
overstated. The Code of Hammurabi, 7 for example, makes no reference to double
jeopardy.' 8 This, in part, led one scholar to conclude that "[t]he alleged universality
of the double jeopardy principle is not apparent from a study of early law."19
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court itself recognized in Palko v. Connecticut"°
that "[d]ouble jeopardy.., is not everywhere forbidden."'"
'3 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 200 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"4 Cullen v. The King, [1949] S.C.R. 658, 668 (Rand, J., dissenting).
SMARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 3 (1969) ("Double jeopardy plays a major
role in such areas as recharging an accused with the same or another offence, new trials,
[government] appeals, discharging the jury, framing an indictment, sentencing on multiple
counts, withdrawing a plea, the relationship between courts, and the recognition of foreign
criminal judgments.").
16 Stout v. State ex rel. Caldwell, 130 P. 553, 558 (Okla. 1913).
"7 See THE OLDEST CODE OF LAWS IN THE WORLD: THE CODE'OF LAWS PROMULGATED
BY HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON, B.C. 2285-2242 (C.H.W. Johns trans., 2000).
"8 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 3 n.6; Note, Double Jeopardy andDual Sovereigns, 35 IND.
L.J. 444, 445 (1960). But see GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY,
THE LAW 1 (1998) (asserting that "laws against changing a final judgment can be traced to
the Code of Hammurabi."); id. at 73 (stating that the first law of Hammurabi contains an
"effective way of preventing a second trial by the same prosecutor after an acquittal" and that
the fifth law contains a way of binding judges to a single verdict).
'9 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 3 n.6.
20 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
2 Id. at 326 n.3. See also RADiN, supra note 10, at 228 (stating that the principle against
placing a person in double jeopardy "is not now an accepted doctrine in Continental
systems").
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Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the protection against double jeopardy
possesses a long history. Ancient Jewish law contains several references to prin-
ciples encompassed by double jeopardy law.22 The Talmud, a compilation of the
teachings of the rabbinic sages, proclaims that in capital cases, an acquittal may not
be reversed.2" In the Old Testament, Deuteronomy 25:2 states that when a dispute
between men is brought before a court, a guilty man who deserves to be beaten shall
be flogged in the presence of the judge according to the measure of his misdeeds.24
The Talmud relates that Rabbi Akiba relied upon this verse to explain why Jewish
law prohibited a person liable to a death penalty by a human tribunal from also
being flogged.25 Rabbi Akiba interpreted the verse to mean that "you make [the
guilty man] liable to punishment for one misdeed, but you cannot hold him liable
[in two ways as] for two misdeeds... [[i].e., death and lashes]., 26 A modem writer
interprets Rabbi Akiba's statement to mean "that for one offense, only one punish-
ment might be inflicted.,
27
The Talmud also contains a discussion by Rabbi Johanan of the situation in which
a man forcibly engages in sexual intercourse with his maiden sister.21 Sexual inter-
course with a maiden was punishable by a fme, whereas forcible sexual intercourse
by a man with his sister, after forewarning, was punishable by flogging. 29 Rabbi
Johanan explained that a man who engaged in forcible sexual intercourse with his
maiden sister would be liable only for the lashes, because Deuteronomy 25:2 means
that "you punish him because of one guilt but not because of two guilts."3
One commentator suggests that the biblical story of Cain and Abel can be
interpreted as showing that "two punishments for the same conduct would have
offended the Hebrew sense ofjustice."' After God banished Cain for killing Abel:
22 See infra notes 23-30.
23 BABYLONIANTALMUD, Sanhedrin 32a, 33b (Isidore Epstein ed., Jacob Shachtertrans.,
Soncino Press 1935); see also HYMAN E. GOLDIN, HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
108-09 & n.6 (1952); SAMUEL MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
ANCIENT HEBREWS 150 & n.358 (2d ed. 1968).
24 The King James Bible translates this provision as "according to his fault,"
Deuteronomy 25:2 (King James), while the Revised Standard version translates it as "in
proportion to his offense." Deuteronomy 25:2 (Revised Standard).
25 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Makkoth 13b (Isidore Epstein ed., H.M. Lazarus trans.,
Soncino Press 1935).
26 Id. (first and third brackets added).
27 GEORGE HOROWiTZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 170 (1973). See also MENDELSOHN,
supra note 23, at 35 & n.62.




a' Note, supra note 18, at 444.
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Cain said unto the LORD, My punishment is greater than I can
bear. Behold, thou hast driven me out this day from the face of
the earth; and from thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be a
fugitive and a vagabond in the earth; and it shall come to pass,
that every one that findeth me shall slay me. And the LORD said
unto him, Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be
taken on him sevenfold. And the LORD set a mark upon Cain,
lest any finding him should kill him.32
Justice Hugo L. Black asserted in his dissenting opinion in Bartkus v. Illinois33
that "[f]ear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same
conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization. Its roots run deep
into Greek and Roman times., 34 An examination of early Greek and Roman law
bears out Justice Black's assertion. Both legal systems contained some form of
protection against double jeopardy. In 355 B.C., the Greek orator and pleader in
law courts Demosthenes, in a speech against Leptines, stated that "the laws forbid
the same man to be tried twice on the same issue, be it a civil action, a scrutiny, a
contested claim, or anything else of the sort., 35 Two years later, in a speech he
wrote to be given by Diodorus against Timocrates, Demosthenes stated: "The legis-
lator does not permit any question once decided by judgement of the court to be put
a second time ....36 It is said that in ancient Athens, "[a] man could not be tried
twice for the same offense., 37 Referring to the practice in the last half of the fifth
century, one scholar wrote: "The main concern of a man brought into court was to
win a verdict by one means or another, for once tried he could not be prosecuted
again on the same charge, the rule ne bis in eadem re being accepted in Athens if
32 Genesis 4:13-15 (King James).
3 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
14 Id. at 151-52 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795
(1969) ("[The guarantee against double jeopardy's] origins can be traced to Greek and
Roman times ....").
" Demosthenes, AgainstLeptines, in OLYNTHIACS, PHILIPPICS, MINORPUBLIC SPEECHES,
SPEECH AGAINST LEPTINES, XX § 147, at 589 (J.H. Vince trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1998)
(1930).
36 Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, in AGAINST MEIDIAS, ANDROTIAN, ARISTOCRATES,
TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON, XXIV § 55, at 407 (J.H. Vince trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1986) (1935).
37 ROBERT J. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS: THE GENESIS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 195 (1927). See also JOHN POTTER, G. DuNBAR & CHARLES ANTHON,
ANTIQUTIES OF GREECE 147 (New York, Collins 1825) ("There shall be no renewing of any
thing dispatched by judges either in public or private matters, or by the people, according to the
enactions of their decrees...."); id. ("The judges are not to proceed so strictly, as that corporal
and pecuniary punishments shall be inflicted at one and the same time.").
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not in Sparta.... . 3 This prohibition against double jeopardy in early Greek law
may have been incomplete, however, for "the pleaders were not slow to find
loopholes in the law and to employ various devices, including charges of false
witness, for reopening questions which had apparently already been disposed of by
the courts."39
In the Roman Republic, an acquittal by a magistrate in a criminal prosecution
barred further proceedings of any kind against the accused.40 The Roman Empire
also provided some protection against double jeopardy. During the early years of
the Empire, "there was no appeal and no chance of reviewing the verdict of a
jury."' On one occasion during the reign of Tiberius in the first century, a jury
acquitted a man Tiberius thought should have been convicted.42 Tiberius scolded
the jury and charged the man with another crime, "but he could not affect the
verdict already given."'43 Shortly thereafter, the rulers of Rome began providing
substitutes for jury trials" and allowing an accuser to seek review of an acquittal in
the imperial appeal courts.45 Despite these new procedures, some protection against
doublejeopardy still existed. lulius Paulus, a leading Roman jurist at the turn of the
third century, stated that "[a]fter a public acquittal a defendant can again be
prosecuted by his informer within thirty days, but after that time this cannot be
done."' The Digest of Justinian, a collection and abridgment of juristic writings
on then-existing Roman law compiled under the Byzantine emperor Justinian I and
published in 533, provided that "[t]he governor must not allow a man to be charged
with the same offenses of which he has already been acquitted,"' and that "a person
cannot be charged on account of the same crime under several statutes." '
38 J. WALTER JONES, THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS: AN INTRODUCTION
148 (1956).
" Id. at 149.
40 H.F. JOLOwIcz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 325 (2d
corrected ed. 1954); 1 JAMES LEIGH STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, PROBLEMS OF THE ROMAN
CRIMINAL LAW 155 (1912).
41 2 STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 157.
42 Id.
41 Id. See also PANDIAs M. SCHISAS, OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE IN ROMAN LAW 190
(1926) (stating that Tiberius had "no right to revise" the jury's decision).
44 2 STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 157.
41 Id. at 177; SCHISAS, supra note 43, at 221-22, 232.
46 THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS 4.17, in I THE CIVIL LAW 323 (S.P. Scott trans., 1973)
(emphasis added).
41 DIG. 48.2.7.2 (Ulpian, De Officio Proconsulis 7), in 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 797
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., Univ. of Pa. Press 1985) (1870).
48 DIG. 48.2.14 (Paulus, De Officio Proconsulis 2), in 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 799
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., Univ. of Pa. Press 1985) (1870).
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The Roman law contained the maxim nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto,49
that is, "[n]o one ought to be punished twice for the same offense." 50 Nonetheless,
the protection against doublej eopardy afforded by Roman law differed significantly
from that accorded an individual under modern double jeopardy principles,
primarily because criminal prosecutions generally were not brought by the state.
Rather, under Roman law, a criminal prosecution could be brought by the victim of
the crime or by any Roman citizen."s In most cases, a person injured by the conduct
of another could elect" to bring either a criminal action against the wrongdoer or,
alternatively, a private action, known a delictual action, seeking a penalty - not
compensation - from the wrongdoer.5 3 Thus, after stating that "[tihe governor
must not allow a man to be charged with the same offenses of which he has already
been acquitted," the Digest ofJustinian explains that this principle means only that
the individual cannot be charged by the same accuser, at least "if the person who
has now come forward as accuser be pursuing his own injury and shows that he had
not known that an accusation had [previously] been brought by another, if there is
good reason he is to be allowed to be an accuser."54
The canon law, which began its development near the end of the Roman
Empire, also contained a prohibition against double jeopardy.55 The Gregorian
49 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 2.
The Code of Justinian contains the following rescript delivered by the Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian in 289:
Anyone who has been charged with a public crime, cannot again be
accused of the same crime by another person. If, however, several
offences arise from the same act, and complaint is only made of one of
them, it is not forbidden for an accusation of another to be filed by
some other individual.
CODE JUST. 9.2.9 (Diocletian & Maximian 289), in 6 THE CIvL LAW 360 (S.P. Scott trans.,
1973).
50 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1736 (8th ed. 2004). This maxim is based upon the more
general maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which BLACK'S translates as
"[n]o one ought to be twice troubled for one and the same cause." Id. Broom translates this
latter maxim as "a man shall not be twice vexed for one and the same cause." HERBERT
BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 247, *321 (6th American ed. 1868).
51 JOLOWICZ, supra note 40, at 331; MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW § 176, at
469 (1927); see also 2 CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD
486 (2d ed. 1922) (stating that in the Republic, "[a]ny Roman citizen or subject, desiring to
cause anybody to be prosecuted criminally, could apply to the presiding judge of the
appropriate court for permission to make an accusation against the alleged offender.");
WOLFGANG KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
29 (J.M. Kelly trans., 2d ed. 1973).
52 RADIN, supra note 51, § 176, at 468.
53 Id. § 44, at 127-28.
-4 DIG. 48.2.7.2 (Ulpian, De Officio Proconsulis 7), in 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 797
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., Univ. of Pa. Press 1985) (1870) (brackets in original).
" FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 5, 326-27; R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL
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Decretals, a compilation of papal decretals (mainly written answers to specific
questions put to the pope) promulgated by Pope Gregory IX in 1234,56 contains a
chapter, taken from a canon of an earlier church council, proclaiming: "An accu-
sation cannot be repeated with respect to those crimes of which the accused has
been absolved."57 The commentary on this chapter states the principle as: "[I]f
anyone is absolved of a crime of which he was accused, he should not again be
accused of the same thing."5" Even earlier, around 1140, Gratian, a Camaldolese
monk who taught in Bologna, published his Concordantia discordantium canonum
(Concordance of discordant canons), known as the Decretum, containing a mass of
authorities from the past, including canons of church councils, scriptural passages,
and decisions of popes.59 The Decretum contains at least two references to double
jeopardy. At one point it states, "The Scripture holds, 'God does not punish twice
in the same matter,"' 60 while at another it proclaims, "'Whether one is condemned
or absolved, there can be no further action involving the same crime.""'6
The canon law's prohibition against double jeopardy emanated from an
interpretation given by Saint Jerome in A.D. 391 of Nahum 1:9, a verse in the Old
Testament.62 The Douay version of the Bible translates this verse as: "there shall
not rise a double affliction;, 63 the King James Bible declares: "[a]ffliction shall not
rise up the second time." 64 Saint Jerome read the verse to mean "that God does not
punish twice for the same act.",65 It was reasoned that if this were so before God,
it should be the same on earth.66
CANON LAw 284, 286-87 (1996); SIGLER, supra note 10, at 3.
56 HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 11-13.
17 Id. at 286 (citing DECRETALS GREGORn IX 5.1.6).
18 Id. (discussing the glossa ordinaria, or gloss, to DECRETALS GREGOR IX 5.1.6).
'9 Id. at 7.
60 Id. at 286 (citing DECRETUM GRATIANI, Distinctio 81, canon 12).
61 Id. (citing DECRETJM GRATIANI, Causa 2, quaestio 1, canon 14).
62 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 5,327; HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 287; SIGLER, supra
note 10, at 3; THOMAS, supra note 18, at 72; see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152
n.4 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
63 Nahum 1:9 (Douay).
4 Nahum 1:9 (King James). The Revised Standard version of the Bible translates the
verse as "[The LORD] will not take vengeance twice on his foes." Nahum 1:9 (Revised
Standard). The New Revised Standard version translates it as "no adversary will rise up
twice," Nahum 1:9 (New Revised Standard), while the New International version translates
it as "trouble will not come a second time." Nahum 1:9 (New International).
65 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 152 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting) (relying upon 25 MIGNE,
PATROLOGIA LATINA 1238 (1845)). See also Z.N. BROOKE, THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE
PAPACY 205 & n. 1 (1989); SIGLER, supra note 10, at 3 (translating the phrase as "God does
not punish twice for the same transgression.").
66 HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 287.
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Some legal scholars have persuasively argued that Saint Jerome erred in his
interpretation of this verse.67 The entire verse in Nahum in the Douay version of the
Bible provides: "What do ye devise against the Lord? he will make an utter end:
there shall not rise a double affliction";68 the King James Bible states: "What do ye
imagine against the LORD? he will make an utter end: affliction shall not rise up the
second time."69 When read in context, this verse appears to mean that God does not
punish the same act twice because there is no need to do so - the first punishment
will make "an utter end" of God's enemies. "The better interpretation of this passage,
then, is that God does not judge twice because it is unnecessary."70 Nevertheless,
Saint Jerome's interpretation of the verse entered church canons as early as 847,71
subsequently to be stated as, "Not even God judges twice for the same act."72
Despite the seemingly absolute nature of the canon law's prohibition against
double jeopardy, "[c]riminal defendants were not in the end given the blanket sort
of protection the words suggest."73 On the other hand, "the reality of the basic
principle within the canon law always remained real enough. 74
II. ENGLISH COMMON LAW
The first recorded mention in English law of an individual raising a plea of a
former acquittal to bar a prosecution for the same offense appears to have occurred
at the beginning of the thirteenth century.75 In a case decided in 1201,76 Goscelin,
the son of Walter, brought a private suit seeking punishment (an action known as
67 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 327 n.1; THOMAS, supra note 18, at 72.
68 Nahum 1:9 (Douay).
69 Nahum 1:9 (King James).
70 THOMAS, supra note 18, at 72. Accord FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 327 n.1.
7' BROOKE, supra note 65, at 205 n.1 (1989). The maxim was cited in the Council of
Mainz in 847 and repeated in the Council of Worms in 868. Id; FRIEDLAND, supra note 15,
at 5 n.4.
72 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 n.4 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). See also
THOMAS, supra note 18, at 72; BROOKE, supra note 65, at 205 n. 1; HELMHOLZ, supra note
55, at 286.
73 HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 287.
71 Id. One commentator points out that "in one sense, double punishment for the same
conduct is implicit in Christianity. The ecclesiastical courts punish now and God will also
punish later." Note, supra note 18, at 446.
7' Hunter, supra note 10, at 16 n.3, points to a case decided in 1203, see infra text
accompanying notes 83-86, as the first recorded mention of the plea, but the plea seems to
have been raised in a case decided two years earlier. See infra text accompanying notes
76-82.
76 2 PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES, 1198-1202, pl. 737 (Doris Mary Stenton
ed., 68 SELDEN SOC'Y 1952 (Sumerset 1201)) [hereinafter 2 PLEAS BEFORETHE KINGORHIS
JUSTICES].
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an "appeal"77) against Adam de Rupe for killing his brother, Ailnoth. 8 As a defense
to the action, Adam claimed that "on another occasion"79 Ailnoth's wife brought an
appeal against him for the same killing and that "he withdrew quit therein by
judgment of the lord king's court."' The court held Goscelin's appeal null because
Goscelin was in Ireland at the time of the killing and did not see or hear it8" and
because "the appealed has withdrawn quit therein," thereby seeming to recognize
Adam's plea of a previous acquittal.8 2
In a case decided two years later, Ralph Russiadic brought an appeal against
Richard Old for killing Richard, the servant of Ralph's lord. 3 Richard Old claimed
that "on a former occasion," Adam of St. Brides brought an appeal for the same
killing against Robert, son of Aier, as principal, and several others, including Richard
Old, as accessories, and that Adam "withdrew from his suit and quit-claimed Robert,
so that [Robert] and those appealed as his accessories were adjudged quit thereof."84
The court, however, did not decide the case on the basis of this plea. 5 Rather,
because Ralph "made no mention of sight or hearing" in his appeal, "the appeal
[was] null."8 6
" See infra text accompanying notes 166-68 for a discussion of "appeals."
78 2 PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES, supra note 76, at pl. 737 (Sumerset 1201).
79 id.
80 id.
81 Id. An appellor had to speak of his own sight and hearing. 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 397-98 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thome trans.,
1968) [hereinafter BRACTON].
82 2 PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES, supra note 76, at pl. 737 (Sumerset 1201).
83 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN A.D. 1200-1225, pl. 76 (F.W. Maitland ed., SELDEN
Soc'Y 1888) (Hundred of Stottesden 1203) [hereinafter 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN].
" Id. At the time, "no man could be tried as accessory till after the principal was
convicted, or at least he must have been tried at the same time with him." 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *40. See also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15
(1980); 1 MATTHEW HALE, [HISTORIA PLAcrroRuM CORONAL] THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN *623-24.
85 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 83, at pl. 76 (Hundred of Stottesden 1203).
86 Id. The appellee (i.e., the accused) in another appeal decided in 1203 raised a defense
resembling a claim of double jeopardy. In that case, Jordan appealed Reiner Reid for
assaulting him and cutting off his fingers. Reiner defended on the ground that "on a former
occasion this appeal came before Sir Geoffrey FitzPeter ... and by his leave a concord was
made between them, so that [Jordan] remitted him from that appeal for ten marks which
[Reiner] paid him." 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 83, at pl. 79 (Borough of
Shrewsbury 1203). A jury found that a concord indeed was made between the parties to the
appeal, which apparently precluded Jordan from bringing the appeal a second time. Id. Sigler
asserts that:
Although it may be tempting to declare [the plea in] this [case] a
double jeopardy plea, the context is not even a criminal case. The state
merely provided a forum for what is essentially a civil suit with
criminal overtones, resolved as a claim in contract by the doctrine of
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In a case decided in 1221,87 Sibil, the widow of Simon of Barton, brought an
appeal against Engelram of Barton as an accessory in the killing of her husband.88
Engelram defended on the ground that Sibil previously had brought an appeal
against him in another county for the same killing and that he had been tried and
acquitted in the king's court there.89 Once again, the court did not determine the
validity of this plea.9" Instead, it dismissed the appeal because Sibil had remarried
and therefore was not a proper party to bring the action.9'
Over the next five hundred years, the guarantee against doublejeopardy became
firmly entrenched in the common law in the form of the pleas of autrefoits acquit
(a former acquittal), autrefoits convict (a former conviction), and pardon. 9 By the
second half of the eighteenth century, Sir William Blackstone, perhaps the most
important writer on the common law, could say that the principle that "no man is
to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once for the same offence"
constitutes a "universal maxim of the common law.
93
accord and satisfaction.
SIGLER, supra note 10, at 11. But at the time this case arose, the distinction between criminal
and civil actions was not as pronounced as it is today. All appeals were "civil" in nature, in
the sense that they were brought by private individuals, yet they sought punishment for an
alleged criminal offense, not compensation for an injury suffered.




9' Id. A wife could bring an appeal for the death of her husband, but "if she marrie[d]
again, before or pending her appeal," she lost that right. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at
*314. See also 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 164 (Amo
Press 1972) (2d ed. corrected 1724).
92 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *335-38.
The common law also recognized the plea ofautrefoits attaint, or a former attainder. Id.
at *336. At common law, when a court entered ajudgment of conviction of a felony against
an individual and sentenced him to death (or upon such circumstances equivalent to a
judgment of death, such as a judgment of outlawry on a capital offense, pronounced for
fleeing from justice and thereby tacitly confessing guilt), the individual became attainted, that
is, stained or blackened. Id. at *380. In the eyes of the law, he was dead. The consequences
of attainder were forfeiture of the individual's property and corruption of blood, so he could
neither inherit lands nor transfer them by descent. See generally id. at *380-89. With some
exceptions, an attainted person could plead autrefoits attaint to bar a new prosecution for the
same or any other felony. Id. at *336. The plea extended to other felonies because a second
prosecution could serve no purpose. As Blackstone explained, "the prisoner is dead in law
by the first attainder, his blood is already corrupted, and he hath forfeited all that he had: so
it is absurd and superfluous to endeavor to attaint him a second time." Id. In this respect, the
plea of autrefoits attaint was broader than the plea of autrefoits convict, which could be
raised only to bar a prosecution for the same offense.
93 Id. at *335.
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Scholars have advanced three different theories explaining the introduction of
the doublej eopardy principle into English common law. One theory postulates that
the principle came from the Continent, either through canon law, which was intro-
duced into England after the Norman conquest in 1066,9' or through Roman law,
which influenced treatise writers and judges.95 These writers, as the theory goes,
supplemented the relatively undeveloped common law with the more refined and
sophisticated jurisprudence of the Roman law.96 In addition, the earliest judges of
the common law courts, as well as the chancellors in England, were members of the
clergy who had studied Roman law.97 When called upon to formulate principles,
it is contended, they naturally turned to the ideas with which they were familiar
from their studies.9"
The second theory advocates that the posthumous victory of Thomas i Becket,
the Archbishop of Canterbury, in the twelfth century power struggle between the
Church and King Henry I1, led to the introduction of the double jeopardy
principle.99 Following his conquest of England, William the Conqueror (William
I) appointed his right-hand man, Lanfranc, an Italian lawyer and theologian, to the
post of Archbishop of Canterbury.' Perhaps to repay the Pope for supporting his
conquest,' ° or perhaps to help him gain control over the English Church," 2 William
encouraged Lanfranc to establish a system of ecclesiastical courts to exist side by
side with the royal courts. 3 These ecclesiastical courts claimed jurisdiction not
only over spiritual matters"°' but also over all criminal and civil cases in which a
clerk (cleric) stood accused of committing a crime or a wrong.'0 5
The relationship between the Church and the King deteriorated after William's
death in 1087.106 In the middle of the twelfth century, Henry II sought to regain
94 HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 286; RADIN, supra note 10, at 228; SIGLER, supra note
10, at 3; Note, supra note 18, at 446-47; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 6.
9' Note, supra note 18, at 446-47; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 6.
96 Note, supra note 18, at 446.
97 id.
98 Id.
9 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 5-6,328; HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 284-85; SIGLER,
supra note 10, at 3.
'0o THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 11,297 (5th
ed. 1956); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 77 (2d ed. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 1898); GoLDwIN SMITH, A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 77 (1955).
10 Hunter, supra note 10, at 5.
102 BROOKE, supra note 65, at 135-37.
103 Hunter, supra note 10, at 5.
"04 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 125-30.
105 Id. at 130; see also SMITH, supra note 100, at 88.
'06 Hunter, supra note 10, at 5.
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jurisdiction over clerics who committed secular offenses.' °7 What motivated Henry
remains a matter of conjecture. Some contend he sought to curb the power of the
Church generally.' 0 Others maintain that he wanted to strengthen law enforcement
in the realm and believed that ecclesiastical courts did not punish criminal clerics
severely enough because they could impose neither the death penalty nor a penalty
involving the shedding of blood.0 9 Henry allegedly quipped that "it took two
crimes to hang a priest.""' By this he meant that a cleric could be defrocked for
committing one crime and only if he thereafter committed a second crime could he,
as a former cleric no longer protected by the Church, be hanged."' Still others
claim that Henry sought to regain jurisdiction over clerics because he needed money
to finance overseas campaigns and coveted the revenue generated for the Church
through fines and forfeitures imposed by ecclesiastical courts." 2
Whatever his motivation, Henry held a council of the magnates of the realm in
1164 and caused to be issued the Constitutions of Clarendon, a formal statement
embodying the previous customs concerning the jurisdiction of the Church in
certain matters.' The third clause of that document provided:
Clergyman charged and accused of anything shall, on being
summoned by a justice of the king, come into his court, to be
responsible there for whatever it may seem to the king's court
they should there be responsible for; and [to be responsible] in
the ecclesiastical court [for what] it may seem they should there
be responsible for - so that the king's justice shall send into
the court of holy church to see on what ground matters are there
to be treated. And if the clergyman is convicted, or [if he] con-
fesses, the church should no longer protect him."4
107 Id.
108 AUSTIN LANE POOLE, FROM DOMESDAY BOOK TO MAGNA CARTA 1087-1216, at
200-02 (2d ed. 1955).
" Id. at 202; BROOKE, supra note 65, at 200; W.L. WARREN, HENRY II 461, 464-65
(1973); see also HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 284.
1O SMITH, supra note 100, at 88.
Id.
.12 Hunter, supra note 10, at 5, 17 n.16.
".. One scholar puts it in these terms: "Henry... sought to restore the jurisdiction of the
King's courts to the position prior to Stephen's disastrous reign." Id. at 5. Stephen of Blois,
the grandson of William the Conqueror, succeeded Henry I in 1135 and reigned until 1154.
See 1 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 360-81 (4th ed. 1883)
(discussing Stephen's reign); see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 449
("[Henry II's scheme] does not profess to represent the practice of Stephen's day. For legal
purposes, Stephen's reign is to be ignored, not because he was an usurper, but because it was
a time of war and of 'unlaw."').
'4 THECONSTITUIONSOFCLARENDONc.3 (1164), reprinted in MICHAELEvANs&R. IAN
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Historians have read this clause in various ways. One scholar maintained that
Henry intended that "clerical criminals should be tried in the ordinary courts of the
country."' 5 Others disputed this interpretation. While admitting that "Henry may
at one time have gone as far as this,"'" 6 Pollock and Maitland could not doubt that
the clause in the Constitutions meant that a clergyman suspected of committing a
crime had to be brought to the royal court and accused there. Unless he admitted
his guilt, he would be sent to the ecclesiastical court for trial in the presence of royal
officers; if convicted in the ecclesiastical court, he would be stripped of his clerical
status and returned to the royal court and then be sentenced - it is unclear whether
there would be a further trial - to the layman's punishment, either death or
mutilation.117 In addition, he would forfeit his property to the King."' This latter
interpretation of the clause has "become almost universally regarded as the proper
interpretation by legal historians. '
Archbishop Becket, whom ironically Henry had appointed to his position in
1162,120 objected to this scheme. He claimed, among other things, that clerics could
be tried and punished only in an ecclesiastical court and that a cleric convicted in
such a court and deposed from his orders could not subsequently be brought to the
royal court for punishment.' 2' To do so, argued Becket, would be to punish him
twice for the same offense in violation of the maxim nec enim Deus iudicat bis in
idipsum (or a variation thereof) and of canon law. 122 The conflict between Henry
JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 12 (1984) (brackets
included in reprint).
115 1 STUBBS, supra note 113, at 523-24.
I6 1 POLLOCK&MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 448 n.1.
17 Id. at 447-48 & n.1; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 326; 1 WILLIAM
HoLDswoRTH, AHISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 615 (4th ed. 1936); PLUCKNETT, supra note 100,
at 18; POOLE, supra note 108, at 206; SMITH, supra note 100, at 89; WARREN, supra note
109, at 481; Hunter, supra note 10, at 5-6.
118 Hunter, supra note 10, at 6.
119 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 326 n.1.
120 Henry II appointed Becket his Chancellor in 1154 and upon the death of Theobald, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1161, Henry persuaded a reluctant Becket to assume the
Archbishopric. WARREN, supra note 109, at 79, 91-92.
121 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 5.
122 Id. at 5 & n.3, 326 & n.5; HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 284; 1 POLLOCK&MArrLAND,
supra note 100, at 448; POOLE, supra note 108, at 206; Hunter, supra note 10, at 6.
Pollock and Maitland had grave doubts that Becket's claims in fact were sanctioned by
canon law. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 454. They wrote that in asserting that
the state could not punish a criminal cleric for a crime for which he already had been deposed
from his orders, "Becket propounded a doctrine which, so far as we are aware, had neither
been tolerated by the state nor consecrated by the church." Id. Moreover, because Becket was
willing to add life imprisonment as an additional sanction in the ecclesiastical courts, "the
principle for which he contended was a highly technical principle condemning not two
punishments but two judgments." Id. at 455-56 n. 1. See also BROOKE, supra note 65, at 204
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and Becket continued for several years, with Becket at one point fleeing to France
and excommunicating several of the King's ministers after Henry seized the
revenues of the see of Canterbury.'23 Becket and the King eventually reached a
compromise, and Becket returned to England.'24 Shortly thereafter, in 1170, four
of Henry's knights murdered Becket inside Canterbury Cathedral.'25 Six years later,
and after the canonization of Becket by Pope Alexander HI, Henry renounced the
provision in the Constitutions that allowed a degraded cleric to be further punished
in the royal court.126 Archbishop Becket's martyrdom and Henry's capitulation, this
theory argues, must have made an impression on the King'sjudges, many of whom
were bishops and archdeacons, and convinced them that "the maxim which Becket
was espousing was worthy of consideration.'
' 27
The third theory explaining the introduction of the protection against double
jeopardy into English common law suggests that "the protection evolved from Anglo-
Saxon criminal procedure as a practical and obvious procedural assumption by the
courts." 2 The proponent of this theory argues that the unimportance of the protection
during the first five hundred years of its existence, as illustrated by its numerous
exceptions and its vulnerability to legislative interference on two occasions 29 without
public or judicial uproar over the loss of liberties, in conjunction with its slow devel-
opment, points towards procedural evolution rather than introduction from Roman
("Henry was possibly claiming even less than the practice of his grandfather [Henry I]....
[U]ntil Becket intervened, clerks were being tried for criminal offences in the king's courts;
I see no reason to believe that this was an innovation suddenly introduced by Henry II.");
POOLE, supra note 108, at 206 ("[Becket] was not on sure ground .... He was taking his
stand, not on what was the law, but what should, in his view, be the law."). But see
FRIEDLAND, supra note 15 at 329-32 (arguing that "Becket's position was much stronger
than the historians would have us believe" and concluding that "Becket's position was the
better one"); Charles Duggan, The Becket Dispute and the Criminous Clerks, 35 BULL. OF
THE INST. OF HIST. REs. 1, 27-28 (1962) (concluding that "[a]s far as canonical consider-
ations are concerned ... the better opinion was.., that of Becket.").
123 POOLE, supra note 108, at 208-09.
124 Id. at 213-14.
25 Id. at 214; SMITH, supra note 100, at 90. See generally WARREN, supra note 109, at
447-518.
126 BROOKE, supra note 65, at 212; 1 POLLOCK & MArTLAND, supra note 100, at 124;
POOLE, supra note 108, at 218; SMITH, supra note 100, at 90.
The resolution of the conflict between Henry II and Becket could be seen to constitute
a complete rejection of the so-called "dual sovereignty" doctrine that subsequently developed
in the United States. See supra note 2 (discussing the so-called "dual sovereignty" doctrine);
infra text accompanying notes 240-42 (discussing the rejection of the "dual sovereignty"
doctrine in England by the Court of King's Bench).
127 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 5-6, 328.
128 Hunter, supra note 10, at 4.
129 1487, 3 Hen. 7, c.1 (Eng.); 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 6 (Eng.). See infra text accompanying
notes 192-96 & notes 211-12.
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law. 30 Had the protection been a product of Roman law, the proponent contends,
it probably would "have established a rule of fundamental doctrine from its
inception."'' Similarly, she claims that the appearance of the plea of a former
acquittal in 1203,132 so soon after the clash between Becket and Henry II, shows that
that conflict could not have played a major role in the introduction of the protection
into English common law.'33 She reasons that "to establish itself as a commonplace
rule... ,"' such "a novel principle would take much longer to percolate through
to [the] courts."'35
Regardless of the theory to which they subscribe, scholars generally agree that
the origin of the protection against double jeopardy in English law "is, and
undoubtedly will remain, a matter of speculation,"'36 because "much of Western law
derives from a common fund of shared judicial concepts."'3 7
The extent to which the common law protected a person against double
jeopardy before Henry II's capitulation in 1176 is difficult to ascertain. Some
evidence suggests that "the earliest English rulers after the Norman Conquest had
little regard for questions of double jeopardy."'3 William iI ("Rufus"), who
reigned from 1087-1100, once tried fifty Englishmen by the ordeal of the hot
iron. 1' When they escaped unhurt and hence were acquitted, William purportedly
"declared he would try them again by the judgment of his court, and would not
abide by this pretended judgment of God... ."" The Charter of Liberties, issued
by Henry I in 1101, contained no mention of a protection against double jeopardy. 4'
In 1163, Henry H's claim that he could retry a cleric, Philip de Brois, following his
acquittal in an ecclesiastical court of murdering a knight'42 brought his dispute with
Becket to a head and constituted a complete rejection of a protection against double
jeopardy.'43 In 1166, Henry II included in the Assize of Clarendon a provision that
130 Hunter, supra note 10, at 4-5.
' Id. at 5.
132 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. As indicated in the text, the plea of
former acquittal most likely originated even before 1203. See supra text accompanying notes
76-82.
133 Hunter, supra note 10, at 6-7.
134 Id. at 7.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 4.
131 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 3.
138 Id. at 6.
139 1 REEVES' HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, FROM THE TIME OF THE ROMANS TO THE
END OF THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH 456 (William S. Hein 1981) (W.F. Finlason ed., 1880).
140 Id.
14" THE CHARTER OF LIBERTIES OF HENRY I (1101), reprinted in EVANS & JACK, supra
note 114, at 49-50.
142 POOLE, supra note 108, at 202; WARREN, supra note 109, at 465-66.
'43 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 6, 330; POOLE, supra note 108, at 203.
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a person acquitted by the ordeal must abjure the realm (i.e., depart the country under
an oath never to return) if he were of bad character,'" once again violating the
principle against double jeopardy.
Even after Becket's murder and Henry's capitulation, a general prohibition
against double jeopardy did not exist in England. The earliest treatise on the
common law, purportedly written by Ranulf de Glanville in the last part of the
twelfth century, 14' does not mention any protection against double jeopardy,'46 nor
is it included in the Magna Carta,147 which was originally issued by King John in
1215148 and reaffirmed by King Edward I in 1297. 149
Thomas i Becket's successor, Archbishop Richard, did not oppose the form of
dual punishment contained in the Constitutions of Clarendon. 15 ° Upset that
Becket's murderers had not been punished for their misdeed, he wanted laymen who
murdered clerics to be excommunicated in the ecclesiastical court and then turned
over to the royal courts to be hanged.'' He assured several of the King's justices
that such a procedure would not punish a person twice for the same offense. 5 2 He
argued that "there is no duplication where what is begun by one is completed by
another"'53 - the exact position Henry had taken concerning offenses committed
by clerics. Indeed, after Henry 11's death, Pope Innocent I (1198-1216) issued a
decree providing that clerics who forged papal letters should be handed over to the
secular courts after first being degraded, and he declared that such a procedure was
144 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 6, 328; 1 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 152;
see also THOMAS, supra note 18, at 79-80.
145 See JOHN BEAMES, A TRANSLATION OF GLANVILLE (Littleton, Fred B. Rothman 1980)
(1812); THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY
CALLED GLANVILL (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1993) [hereinafter TREATISE ON GLANvILL]. Scholars
question whether Glanville (sometimes spelled Glanvil or Glanvill) (d. 1190), who served
as chiefjusticiar, or prime minister, of England under Henry II, actually wrote this treatise.
They suggest it may have been the work of Glanville's secretary, Hubert Walter, who later
became chiefjusticiar himself. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 163-64 & n.5;
see also G.D.G. Hall, Introduction to TREATISE ON GLANVILL, supra, at xxx-xxxiii; 2
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 189-90.
146 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 7 n. 1; SIGLER, supra note 10, at 12; Hunter, supra note
10, at 18 n.36.
147 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 4.
141 MAGNA CARTA (1215), reprinted in RAY STINGHAM, MAGNA CARTA: FOUNTAINHEAD
OF FREEDOM 227 (1966).
149 MAGNA CARTA (1297), reprinted in EVANS & JACK, supra note 114, at 51-55.
5 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 7; Hunter, supra note 10, at 17 n.21.
I5' 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 457.
152 Id. at 456.
153 BROOKE, supra note 65, at 220. Brooke disagrees with Pollock and Maitland's conclusion
that Archbishop Richard advocated both excommunication and execution. Id at 220 n. 1. He
asserts that Richard wanted the offenders tried in an ecclesiastical court and, if found guilty,
handed over to a secular court for punishment without first being excommunicated. Id
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sanctioned by the Decretum.i s4 That position, too, was consistent with Henry's
claim in his controversy with Becket.
The clash between Henry II and Archbishop Becket spawned the institution of
"benefit of clergy,"' 55 which in its original form exempted clerics who committed
felonies from the jurisdiction of the royal courts.'56 After being brought before one
of the King's justices and saying that he could not answer in a royal court, a cleric
would be turned over to the ecclesiastical courts for trial without any inquiry on the
part of the justice concerning his guilt or innocence. 1 7 Sometime before the end of
the reign of Henry III in 1272, however, the procedure was changed so that the royal
court first determined the guilt or innocence of the cleric.' The justices conducted
an "inquest ex officio" (an inquiry into the right of the King to the cleric's goods),
which technically did not constitute a "trial."' 59 Nevertheless, if the jurors found
against the cleric, he was delivered to Church authorities and tried in an ecclesiastical
court."6 If convicted in that court, the royal court ordered his chattels forfeited to the
King."' The Church protested this procedure on grounds that it inflicted double
punishment, but to no avail, 62 once again showing that the protection against double
jeopardy was not generally accepted.
The principle against double jeopardy was violated also by a statute enacted
early in the fourteenth century in an attempt to ensure that the royal courts remained
paramount to the ecclesiastical courts in situations in which both had jurisdiction
over the act of an individual. 163 That statute allowed the royal courts to ignore the
determination of an ecclesiastical court and any punishment imposed by such a
court. It provided that "[w]hen any one Case is debated before Judges Spiritual [or]
Temporal, as ... upon the Case of laying violent Hands on a Clerk, [it is thought,]
that notwithstanding the Spiritual Judgement, the King's Court shall discuss the
same Matter. ' 6a
Situations not involving clergy, however, show some recognition of the
principle against double jeopardy following the Henry II-Becket dispute, but its
development and emergence into modem double jeopardy law was slow. One
1"4 1 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 455 & n.1; see also FRIEDLAND, supra
note 15, at 7, 329.
155 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 328; HELMHOLZ, supra note 55, at 285; Hunter, supra
note 10, at 6.
156 1 POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 100, at 441; see also Hunter, supra note 10, at
6.
' 1 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 441-42.




162 Id. at 442 & n.1; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 7, 333.
163 See FREEDLAND, supra note 15, at 333-34.
164 1315-16, 9 Edw. 2, stat.l, c. 6 (Eng.).
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explanation for its slow growth is that the power to prosecute for offenses had not yet
coalesced in the state.165 At least since the Norman Conquest, criminal prosecutions
could be brought not only by the King by means of an indictment, but also by a private
subject in a suit against another demanding punishment for the particular wrong he
suffered, i.e., a "suit of vengeance,"'66 rather than for the offense against the public. '67
This latter method of prosecution, known as an "appeal," initially could be used for
a variety of offenses, although by the end of the thirteenth century its use was limited
to serious ones. 6 By its very nature, the protection against double jeopardy consti-
tutes a limitation on the power of the state to prosecute and punish an individual. As
one scholar put it, "[t]he state's gathering of the power to institute suit is a prerequi-
site to a true double jeopardy situation .... 169
By the beginning of the thirteenth century, ajudgment of acquittal in an appeal
brought by a private individual barred a further suit by that individual 7 ' and by any
other individual otherwise entitled to bring an appeal. 7' Bracton, in a treatise
165 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 6-7. In addition, Friedland suggests that the rule against
double jeopardy "understandably" developed slowly "until the elimination of trial by ordeal
in 1219.. ." because of the ease of obtaining an unwarranted acquittal in such trials. Id.
166 Marion S. Kirk, "Jeopardy" During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REV.
602, 605 (1934) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *312-17; 2 HAWKINS, supra note 91, at
155-204; 1 JAMES FITzJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
244-50 (London, MacMillan 1883); Hunter, supra note 10, at 8-9; Kirk, supra note 166, at
605-06.
168 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *314; 2 HAWKINS, supra note 91, at 157, 161-62;
2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 257; Kirk, supra note 166, at 605.
169 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 9. See also id. at 8 ("Since double jeopardy involves a
limitation upon the power of the state to bring suit, by the time of its formulation criminal
procedure must have developed to a point where the state had the power to conduct criminal
actions at its discretion.").
170 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 83, at pl. 158 (Hundred ofKington 1221).
See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 8; Kirk, supra note 166, at 607. But see
INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., at 258, 375-76, 62 SELDEN
SOC'Y (C.T. Flower ed., 1944) (discussing a case arising in approximately 1208 in which
several appeals of the same individual for the same act were allowed despite previous
acquittals).
17' 1 SELECTPLEASOFTHECROWN, supra note 83, atpl. 76 (Hundred of Stottesden 1203);
2 PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES, supra note 76, at pl. 737 (Sumerset 1201);
Hunter, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that at that time an appeal could be brought by anyone
"who had raised a hue and cry and could substantiate the appeal with detailed first-hand
knowledge of the crime") (internal citations omitted); see also FLETA, bk. I, ch. 32, at 26,
reprinted in 72 SELDEN SOC'Y 82 (H.G. Richardson & G.O.Sayles eds. & trans., 1953)
(c. 1290) ("[T]he appellee may... except against the appeal and say that he was appealed on
another occasion of the same deed and was acquitted thereof by judgement of the court
.... ") (written approximately 1290, supposedly by a judge imprisoned in Fleet prison for
malpractices).
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written sometime between 1220 and 1256, stated that a person against whom an
appeal was brought "may except against the appeal by saying that he had earlier
been appealed of the same deed by another and had departed quit by judgment, in
proof whereof he may vouch the rolls and the record of the justices."'7 2 This rule
applied not only to acquittals by a jury, but also to those obtained through trial by
battle.'73 Bracton stated:
When [an appellee] has elected to make his defence by his body
and all the elements necessary for an appeal are in order, let the
duel be waged at once. If he has been appealed by several of
one deed and one wound and successfully makes his defence
against one, he will depart quit against all . . . because he
thereby proves his innocence against all, as though he had put
himself on the country [i.e., had been tried by a jury] and it had
exonerated him completely.1
74
Around the middle of the thirteenth century, it became clear that Spanish law recognized
a protection against double jeopardy. The Fuero Real, promulgated by King Alfonso X of
Castile and Leon in 1255, provided: "After a man, accused of any crime, has been acquitted
by the court, no one can afterwards accuse him of the same offence (except in certain
specified cases)" (quoted in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 120 (1904), also quoted
in Lebbeus R. Wilfley, Trial by Jury and "Double Jeopardy'" in the Philippines, 13 YALE
L.J. 421, 424 (1904)). Several years later, Las Siete Partidas, also promulgated by Alfonso
X, was completed. It proclaimed: "Where a man has been acquitted, by a valid judgment, of
some offense of which he was accused, no one can afterwards charge him with the same
offense [except when he colluded in bringing the original charge and suppressed evidence
in order to obtain the acquittal]." 5 LAS StaTE PARTIDAS 1309 (Robert I. Bums ed., Samuel
Parsons trans., Univ. of Pa. Press 2001). It went on to provide that:
where one man accuses another of the death of a third party who is not
his relative, and the accused person answers the accusation, and is
acquitted of it in court; from that time forth none of the relatives of the
deceased can bring an accusation against him for the offense of which
he was acquitted ....
Id. This latter protection against double jeopardy following an acquittal in a homicide case
was incomplete however, for an exception existed "where the relative [of the deceased] who
wishes to accuse [the original defendant] a second time swears that he was not aware of the
fact when the other party, who was a stranger, accused him." Id. In such circumstances, "the
defendant will be bound to answer the accusation brought against him." Id.
172 2 BRACTON, supra note 81, at 397.
... The appellee in an appeal by a private individual generally could elect either trial by
jury or trial by battle. Id. at 385-86, 390; BRITTON: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES
87 (Francis Morgan Nichols ed., 1901) [hereinafter BRITTON].
174 2 BRACTON, supra note 81, at 391 (citations omitted). See also id. at 388 ("[S]everal
persons may appeal one man of one and the same deed and the same wound. If the appellee
successfully makes his defence against one of the several or withdraws quit by judgment he
will be discharged as against all the others and depart quit.").
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Britton, writing around 1290,' said that in appeals of homicides, "the defendant
may say that at another time there was an appeal in our Court between the same
persons for the same felony, and that he was acquitted thereof before such Justices;
and if he avouches this by warrant of record, and the record passes in his favour, he
shall be awarded quit."' 76
In the fourteenth century,'77 and perhaps even earlier,' a judgment of acquittal
in a suit brought on an indictment by the King barred a further suit on an indictment
by the King. It is unclear whether at this time an acquittal on an appeal by a private
individual barred an indictment by the King. Bracton, writing in the thirteenth cen-
tury, indicated that it did, stating that an acquittal of an appeal of homicide barred a
suit by the King for the same deed. 179 Professor Friedland, however, states that
"during the thirteenth and part of the fourteenth centuries a suit by an appellor would
17' The identity of"Britton" is uncertain. Although Sir Edward Coke attributed the book
to John Britton (or de Breton), bishop of Hereford, the bishop died in 1275, fifteen years
before the treatise was written. It has been suggested that the author was Sir John le Breton,
of Blatherwyk, who may also have been known as Sir John de Bretaign. Simeon E. Baldwin,
Introduction to BRrrrON, supra note 173, at viii-xi.
176 BRrrTON, supra note 173, at 94. By Britton's time, an appeal of homicide could be
brought only by "the male nearest in blood of the kindred of him who has been feloniously
killed, or one who has done homage to him or been of his household." Id. at 91. See also 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *314.
The only crime against one's relation, for which an appeal can be
brought, is that of killing him, by either murder or manslaughter. But
this cannot be brought by every relation: but only by the wife for the
death of her husband, or by the male heir for the death of his ancestor
Id.
' See Kirk, supra note 166, at 607 & n.29 (stating that "[o]ne indictment was a bar to a
second" and citing examples of cases from the fourteenth century England); see also 3 YEAR
BOOKS OF THE REIGN OF KING EDWARD THE FIRST 522 (Alfred J. Horwood ed., trans., Kraus
Reprint Ltd. 1964) (1863) [hereinafter KING EDWARD THE FIRST].
178 Friedland asserts that "[i]n the thirteenth century.... a judgment in a suit brought on
indictment by the King barred a further suit by the King." FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 8
(emphasis added). In support of this statement, Friedland cites Kirk, supra note 166, at 607;
however, it appears that the earliest case cited by Kirk was decided in the beginning of the
fourteenth century. Id.
179 2 BRACTON, supra note 81, at 391.
If he has been appealed by several of one deed and one wound and
successfully makes his defence against one [in a trial by battle], he will
depart quit against all, also as regards the king's suit, because he
thereby proves his innocence against all, as though be had put himself
on the country [i.e., elected a trial by jury] and it had exonerated him
completely.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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not bar a suit by the King.... "180 On the other hand, it seems that, at least well into
the fourteenth century, an acquittal on an indictment did not bar an appeal by a
private individual for the same offense. 8' Britton stated that "although [an appellee
of homicide] acquit himself as to our [i.e., the King's] suit, yet the suit of any other,
who will prosecute within the year and day, is not thereby taken away."' 82 One
modem scholar asserts that "at least up to the mid-fourteenth century, if a verdict
of acquittal at the suit of the King preceded an appeal the courts would hold the
earlier acquittal null and void."' 83
Conviction of a felony at this time carried a mandatory death penalty; therefore,
a prohibition against a second conviction was irrelevant.'84 If the King pardoned
an individual convicted on an appeal, the pardon operated to prevent a subsequent
prosecution by the King for the same offense."'5 However, a conviction on an
indictment, followed by a pardon, would not bar an appeal by a private party, 186 "for
the pardon invariably was on the condition that the defendant 'stand to right' (stet
recto) to answer the suit of the party."'187
Certainly by the fifteenth century, an acquittal on an appeal following a trial by
jury'88 barred a prosecution for the same offense by indictment,'89 and an acquittal
i80 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 8-9 (citing BRITTON, supra note 173, at 86-87).
..' See Kirk, supra note 166, at 607 n.26 (citing examples of this proposition); see also
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *315 ("[I]f [an offender] made his peace with the king, still
he might be prosecuted at the suit of the party."); FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 8-9.
182 BrITON, supra note 173, at 94.
183 Hunter, supra note 10, at 11-12.
1 4 Id. at 18 n.37 (citing 2 BRACTON, supra note 81, at 400); see also Kirk, supra note 166,
at 607 n.25.
185 Kirk, supra note 166, at 607 n.25.
186 3 KING EDWARD THE FIRST, supra note 177, at 504; id. at 514; Kirk, supra note 166,
at 608; see also Smith v. Bowen, (1709) 88 Eng. Rep. 998 (Q.B.); (1709) 88 Eng. Rep. 1008
(Q.B.); (1709) 88 Eng. Rep. 1022 (Q.B.) (involving an appeal of murder lodged against an
individual who had been previously indicted, convicted, and then pardoned by the Queen for
the same murder); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 482 ("The king could not
protect the man-slayer from the suit of the dead man's kin. Even when the pardon was
granted on the score of misadventure, this suit was saved by express words.").
187 Kirk, supra note 166, at 608.
188 It is unclear whether an acquittal after a trial by battle barred a prosecution by
indictment. Id. at 607 n.25. The issue may not have been of much importance, though,
because nearly all appeals were tried by jury. Id. at 606 & n.23.
189 Id. at 607 n.25 (discussing scholars' views on "whether an acquittal after a trial by
battle was a bar to a prosecution by indictment"); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at
*315 ("[I]f any offender gained a verdict in his favour, when prosecuted by the party injured,
he was also understood to be acquitted of any crown prosecution for the same offence....");
id. at *335 ("[A]n acquittal on an appeal is a good bar to an indictment on the same
offence."); FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 9; SIGLER, supra note 10, at 10.
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on an indictment barred an appeal for the same offense.19° In such situations, the
accused could plead the former acquittal as a bar to the subsequent prosecution. 9'
In 1487, however, a statute created a limited exception to the plea of a former
acquittal.'92 By that time, a general practice had developed in homicide cases in
favor of appeals. An individual could not be tried on an indictment for homicide
until more than a year and a day after the death of the victim 93 - a year and a day
being the period within which an appeal could be brought by those (the wife or the
male heir of the deceased)' 94 entitled to prosecute an appeal of death. 95 Frequently,
though, witnesses died during that time period, or the matter was forgotten. To
remedy this situation, the statute provided for the immediate prosecution of an
indictment for homicide without waiting for an appeal, and it removed the plea of
a former acquittal as a bar to the prosecuting of an appeal for the same death so long
as the appeal was brought within a year and a day.' 96
This "loophole" created by the statute proved to be of little practical signifi-
cance, however. 97 Courts construed it extremely narrowly, and it was never broad-
ened beyond homicide cases.' 9 Moreover, the statute "soon fell into disuse."' 99
'90 4 YEAR BOOKS OF THE REIGN OF KING EDWARD THE THIRD 154 (Luke Owen Pike ed.,
trans., Kraus Reprint Ltd. 1964) (1888) [hereinafter KING EDWARD THE THIRD]; Kirk, supra
note 166, at 607 n.28, 608 (citing English cases from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries);
see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *315; id. at *335 ("And so also was an acquittal
on an indictment a good bar to an appeal, by the common law.... ."); FRIEDLAND, supra note
15, at 9; SIGLER, supra note 10, at 8, 10; Hunter, supra note 10, at 12.
If a person abandoned an appeal, the prosecution could continue on the appeal "at the
suit of the king." Kirk, supra note 166, at 606 (internal quotations omitted). An acquittal or
conviction at the suit of the king apparently barred a subsequent prosecution by means of
indictment and vice versa. See id. at 607 & nn.27-28 (for examples of cases from the reigns
of Edward I and Edward IV).
'9' See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *335-36; 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW *452, *461.
192 1487, 3 Hen. 7, c. 1 (1487) (Eng.).
'91 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *335; FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 9; 2 HAWKINS,
supra note 91, at 162.
'94 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *314.
' See id. at *314-15; 2 HAWKINS, supra note 91, at 162-66; Kirk, supra note 166, at
605-06 & n.20.
196 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *335-36; FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 9-10;
SIGLER, supra note 10, at 8; 1 STEPHEN, supra note 167, at 248-49; Hunter, supra note 10,
at 12; Kirk, supra note 166, at 607 n.26, 608.
'9' See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 153 n.6 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
'9s FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 10; 2 HAWKINS, supra note 91, at 373-74; see also 1
CHITrY, supra note 191, at *462-63.
'99 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 153 n.6 (Black, J., dissenting); see also FRIEDLAND, supra note
15, at 10 ("Because the use of the procedure of appeal was on the decline by this time, the
dual procedure was probably not widely employed."); 1 STEPHEN, supra note 167, at 249
(stating that the result of the trial on an indictment was "practically conclusive" unless it
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Although Parliament did not formally abolish prosecution by appeal until 1819,200
by the early part of the eighteenth century, that method of prosecution was "all but
practically obsolete. 20' Nevertheless, as late as 1709, an appeal was brought after
an acquittal.20 2 In Young v. Slaughterford, Chief Justice Holt ordered an appeal for
murder to be brought against a man who previously had been acquitted against the
evidence on an indictment for the same offense. 203 A jury convicted the man on the
appeal,204 and he apparently was sentenced to death.205 Indeed, it was an appeal
after an acquittal for murder2 6 that prompted Parliament to abolish prosecutions
by appeal.2
7
Perhaps because of the statute of Henry VII in 1487,208 the sixteenth century,
for the most part, proved to be a "dark period" in the development of rules
prohibiting double jeopardy.20 9 In an apparent attempt to prevent Welsh criminals
from receiving favorable treatment from Welsh juries, 2'0 a statute was enacted in
153411 allowing individuals acquitted of felonies committed in Wales to be tried
in the adjoining English county within two years of the alleged offense.212 In 1591,
the Court of King's Bench, the highest court in England, held in Vaux's Case that
an individual acquitted of an offense under an insufficient indictment could be tried
again for the same offense under a new indictment because he was never in
jeopardy under the defective indictment.2 3  This was one of several judicial
decisions "stultify4ing] the widening of the protection [against doublejeopardy]."214
resulted in an acquittal "under circumstances which greatly dissatisfied the parties concerned").
200 1819, 59 Geo.3, c.46 (Eng.).
201 1 STEPHEN, supra note 167, at 247. See also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *312
(stating that prosecution by appeal is "very little in use"); Kirk, supra note 166, at 605
("[T]he appeal became obsolete long before [its abolition by statute in 1819]."); id. at
608-09 (by 1818, "prosecution by appeal had become well-nigh forgotten."). See generally
2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 360-61 (tracing decay of use of appeals).
202 Young v. Slaughterford, (1709) 88 Eng. Rep. 999 (Q.B.).
203 Id.
204 See Young v. Slaughterford, (1709) 88 Eng. Rep. 1007 (Q.B.).
205 Kirk, supra note 166, at 608.
206 Ashford v. Thornton, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 149 (K.B.) (involving an appeal of murder
brought by the victim's brother against an individual following that individual's indictment
and acquittal by a jury for the same killing).
207 See FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 8; 1 STEPHEN, supra note 167, at 249; Hunter, supra
note 10, at 19 n.57; Kirk, supra note 166, at 608-09.
208 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 10.
209 Hunter, supra note 10, at 13.
210 Id. at 12.
211 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 6 (Eng.).
212 Hunter, supra note 10, at 12.
213 Vaux's Case, (1591) 76 Eng. Rep. 992, 993 (K.B.).
214 Hunter, supra note 10, at 13.
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Despite these "significant lapses" '215 in the development of sound rules against
double jeopardy, the sixteenth century saw a legal text describe in detail for the first
time the pleas of autrefoits acquit (a former acquittal) and autrefoits convict (a
former conviction) and present them as principles of law.216 This text, written by
Sir William Staunford in 1557,217 "was the first to use the Norman-French labels to
describe the pleas.., and the first to mention the plea of previous conviction, albeit
in a form which bears little resemblance to its modem manifestation.' '218 At that
time, though, the pleas "still represented little more than a set of rules of procedure
,,219of no great pre-eminence.
Modem double jeopardy law began to emerge in England in the last half of the
seventeenth century.22' By that time, prosecutions by the King had begun replacing
private prosecutions by appeal as the preferred method of prosecution,22' thereby
fulfilling the "prerequisite to a true double jeopardy situation., 222 In addition, Sir
Edward Coke's Institutes had been published posthumously in 1641 and 1644. In
his Third Institutes, 223 Lord Coke, whom one scholar called "a fountainhead of
double jeopardy law, 224 described the basis for double jeopardy, clarifying the
concept and emphasizing its importance.2 5 Largely restating Bracton, Britton, and
Staunford, Coke incorporated "the slowly growing body of case law" concerning
double jeopardy.226 Coke's work did not indicate any important advances in the
application of the pleas of autrefoits acquit, autrefoits convict, and pardon, which
"remained the only manifestations of the rule against double jeopardy. 2 27 Indeed,
215 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 10.
216 2 WILLIAM STAUNFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORON 105-08 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., London,
Prof. Books 1971) (1557).
217 Id.
218 Hunter, supra note 10, at 13. Hunter's article contains an excellent summary of
Staunford's treatment of the protection against double jeopardy. See id. at 13-14.
219 Id. at 14.
220 See generally FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 11-13 (citing intermittent barring of trials
due to double jeopardy in the late seventeenth century); SIGLER, supra note 10, at 16-21
(tracing the emergence of the double jeopardy exception in English common law).
221 Cf 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *312 (stating that prosecution by appeal is "very
little in use"); Kirk, supra note 166, at 605 ("[T]he appeal became obsolete long before [its
abolition by statute in 1819]."). See generally 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 117, at 360-61.
222 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 9.
223 3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITuTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (M. Flesher ed., London,
W. Lee & D. Parkman 1644).
224 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 17.
225 See id. at 16-17; 3 COKE, supra note 223, at 213-14, 233-40.
226 Hunter, supra note 10, at 14 (concluding that the case law "by and large led the law
deeper and deeper into a mire of tangled technical and artificial rules").
227 Id. Coke also described the plea of autrefoits attaint. See COKE, supra note 223, at 213.
For a discussion of the plea of autrefoits attaint, see supra note 92.
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the English Bill of Rights enacted in 1689 made no mention of a protection against
double jeopardy.228
Shortly after the publication of Coke's Institutes, Sir Matthew Hale wrote The
History of the Pleas of the Crown (Historia Placitorium Coronae).2 29 Like Coke,
Hale detailed the pleas of autrefoits acquit, autrefoits convict, and pardon,230 but
also like Coke, "many of his observations are studded with legal anachronisms. 231
Whether Hale's work influenced the development of double jeopardy law during
the seventeenth century is unclear because it was not published until 1736-39, more
than sixty years after his death.
During the last half of the seventeenth century, English courts began dealing
with a variety of double jeopardy issues, such as whether an individual acquitted of
an offense could be re-indicted for a different offense based upon the same conduct
for which he had been acquitted.232 For example, in Turner, the court held that
William Turner's acquittal of burglary for breaking into the house of a Mr. Tryon
and taking away great sums of money barred his subsequent prosecution under an
indictment charging him with the same burglary for breaking into Mr. Tryon's
house and taking away the money of Tryon's servant, Hills.233 Nevertheless, the
court also concluded that Turner could be prosecuted for stealing the money be-
longing to Hills because that constituted a different crime than burglary.234
Overall, in the 1660s, the Court of King's Bench expanded the protection
against double jeopardy considerably. Among other things, that Court held that a
prosecutor could not seek a new trial following an acquittal.235 It also held that a
bill of exceptions could not be employed in criminal cases.236 In so holding, the
Court refused to expand the scope of review by writ of error, which was limited to
errors on the face of the trial record. Because a second proceeding was permitted
when a conviction was reversed on a writ of error,2 37 had the Court not limited the
use of a bill of exceptions, further trials would have been permitted in criminal
cases.
238
228 1688, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2 (Eng.).
229 2 HALE, supra note 84.
230 Id. at *240-55. Hale also discussed the plea of autrefoits attaint. See id. at *251-55.
231 SIGLER, supra note 10, at 16; see also Hunter, supra note 10, at 15.
232 See FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 11-13.
233 (1664) 84 Eng. Rep. 1068 (K.B.).
234 Id.; see also Jones & Bever, (1665) 84 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B.) (holding that Jones's and
Bever's acquittals of burglary for breaking into the King's house at Whitehal and stealing the
goods of Lord Cornburybarred their subsequent prosecution under an indictment charging them
with the same burglary for breaking into the house and stealing the goods of a Mr. Nunnesy, but
also concluding that they might be prosecuted for the theft of Nunnesy's goods).
23 The King v. Read, (1660) 83 Eng. Rep. 271 (K.B.) (1 Lev. 9).
236 Sir Henry Vane's Case, (1662) 83 Eng. Rep. 300 (K.B.).
237 FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 238.
238 Id. at 11-12.
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During the last half of the seventeenth century, the Court of King's Bench recog-
nized judgments of other criminal courts in England, so an acquittal in any such court
that had jurisdiction of the matter barred a subsequent prosecution for the same crime
in the Court of King's Bench.239 In addition, the Court of King's Bench held that an
acquittal in another country barred a subsequent prosecution for the same offense in
England,24 concluding in Rex v. Hutchinson241 that Hutchinson's previous acquittal
of murder in Portugal barred his prosecution in England for the same killing. 42
During that same period, the Court of King's Bench also dealt with the practice
frequently engaged in by trial judges of discharging the jury when it appeared an
acquittal was imminent, thereby affording the prosecutor the opportunity to bring
a stronger case in a new trial. In The King v. Perkins,243 the Court prohibited the
practice, with Chief Justice Lord Holt stating that "it was the opinion of all the
Judges of England, upon debate between them, that in all capital cases, a juror
cannot be withdrawn, though the parties consent to it: that in criminal cases, not
capital, ajuror may be withdrawn, if both parties consent, but not otherwise. ...""
By the second half of the eighteenth century, the pleas of autrefoits acquit,
autrefoits convict, and pardon were fixtures in English common law.245 In his
239 Id. at 12 (quoting 2 HAwKINs, supra note 91, at 372).
240 Despite the statute of 1534 allowing individuals acquitted of felonies committed in
Wales to be tried anew in England within two years of the alleged offense, 1534, 26 Hen. 8,
c. 6 (Eng.), the Court of King's Bench in The King v. Thomas, (1664) 83 Eng. Rep. 1180,
1181 (K.B.), (1664) 83 Eng. Rep. 326,327 (K.B.), held that Thomas's acquittal in Wales on
a charge of murder barred a subsequent trial in England for the same killing. At the time that
Thomas arose, however, statutes had legally incorporated Wales into England, so the court
in Thomas may only have been holding that English law prohibited successive prosecutions
in English courts. Note, supra note 18, at 447-48 & n.27. Friedland, after initially asserting
that Thomas was a case in which the court "barred further proceedings in England because
of a trial in another jurisdiction," subsequently acknowledges that "it is not a 'clearcut'
decision that an English court will recognize a foreign criminal judgment[, because] Wales
was part of England and Thomas had formerly been tried before one of the King's Judges in
a proceeding brought in the name of the King." FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 12, 362
(citations omitted).
241 (1677) 84 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B.) (the decision does not report the facts of the case,
only that the defendant was denied bail). See Beak v. Thyrwhit, (1688) 87 Eng. Rep. 124,
125 (K.B.) (discussing Rex v. Hutchinson); see also The King v. Roche, (1775) 168 Eng.
Rep. 169, 169 n.(a) (C.C.) (referencing Rex v. Hutchinson).
242 But see FRIEDLAND, supra note 15, at 363 (stating that it is uncertain whether the court
in Hutchinson held that the defendant could not be tried in England or should not be tried
there).
243 (1698) 90 Eng. Rep. 1122 (K.B.).
244 Id.
245 The common law also recognized the plea of autrefoits attaint. See supra note 92.
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monumental treatise, Sir William Blackstone set forth the following rules that
applied to all but homicide cases, which were governed by the statute of 1487.246
He stated:
First, [under] the plea of autrefoits acquit, or a former
acquittal,... when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon
any indictment, or other prosecution, before any court having
competent jurisdiction of the offence, he may plead such
acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime.
Therefore an acquittal on an appeal is a good bar to an indict-
ment on the same offence. And so also was an acquittal on an
indictment a good bar to an appeal, by the common law ....
Secondly, the plea of autrefoits convict, or a former
conviction for the same identical crime, though no judgment
was ever given, or perhaps will be, (being suspended by the
benefit of clergy or other causes,) is a good plea in bar to an
indictment....
Lastly, a pardon may be pleaded in bar; as at once destroy-
ing the end and purpose of the indictment, by remitting that
punishment which the prosecution is calculated to inflict.247
Ill. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION IN AMERICA BEFORE THE
ADOPTION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
While double jeopardy law continued to develop in England during the seven-
teenth century, it began to take root in England's colonies in North America. In 1639,
the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Act for the Liberties of the People, which
has been called "the first American Bill of Rights." '248 Although the Act did not
contain an express protection against double jeopardy, it reaffirmed the principle that
the inhabitants of the Colony (with the exception of slaves) "[s]hall have and enjoy
all such rights liberties immunities priviledges and free customs... as any naturall
born subject of England hath or ought to have or enjoy in the Realm of England by
force or vertue of the common law or Statute Law of England."24 9
The first colonial enactment containing an express guarantee against double
jeopardy appeared in 1641 when the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay
246 See supra text accompanying notes 192-96.
247 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *335-36, *337.
248 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 67 (1971).
249 Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People (1639), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 248, at 68.
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Colony enacted the Body of Liberties. ° This detailed charter of liberties served
as the model for other colonies and was "the most important ... forerunner of the
federal Bill of Rights."25' Paragraph 42 of the Body of Liberties stated that "[n]o
man shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice for one and the same Crime, offence,
or Trespasse. '252 Seven years later came the Laws and Liberties of 1648. This code
included the double jeopardy provision contained in the Body of Liberties. 253 It also
contained a provision stating that "everie Action between partie and partie and
proceedings against delinquents in criminal Causes shall be... entred in the rolls
of everie Court by the Recorder therof, that such Actions be not afterwards brought
again to the vexation of any man. '"254
Connecticut also adopted a provision against doublejeopardy. 255 The Connecticut
Code of 1652 included a clause, which its authors took from the Massachusetts Bay
Colony's Body of Liberties, providing that "no Person shall be twice sentenced by
Civil Justice for one and the same Crime .... 2s 6 In addition, the Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolina, a document drafted by the political philosopher John Locke
but never adopted, contained a provision stating that "[n]o cause shall be twice tried
in any one court, upon any reason or pretence whatsoever."257
After the Revolutionary War, the former colonies formed the United States of
America under the Articles of Confederation. While guaranteeing the free inhabitants
of each State "all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States, 258
the Articles of Confederation did not contain a Bill of Rights or an express protection
against double jeopardy.259 Similarly, most state constitutions at that time did not
contain an express guarantee against double jeopardy, although some provided for the
250 See 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 248, at 71.
251 Id. at 69.
252 Mass. Body of Liberties 42 (1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES:
DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND BILL OF RIGHTS 153 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
253 THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS: REPRINTED FROM THE COPY OF THE
1648 EDITION IN THE HENRY E. HUNTINGTON LIBRARY 46 (1929).
254 Id. at 47 (emphasis in original). This provision appears in the section mandating the
keeping of court records, however, which raises the question whether the legislature intended
it to create an additional protection against double jeopardy.
255 See Christopher Collier, The Common Law and Individual Rights in Connecticut
Before the Federal Bill of Rights, 76 CONN. B.J. 1 (2002).
256 Id. at 12.
257 THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITuTIONS OF CAROLINA 64 (1669), reprinted in 5 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 2780 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
258 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1778).
259 Id.
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common law of England to remain in force unless altered by statute.2 "° The common
law of England, of course, recognized the pleas ofautrefoits acquit, autrefoits convict,
and pardon.26'
The first state constitution to incorporate an express protection against double
jeopardy was the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784. Article XVI of that
constitution's Bill of Rights provided: "No subject shall be liable to be tried, after
an acquittal, for the same crime or offence." '262 Shortly after New Hampshire
adopted a constitutional protection against doublejeopardy, Pennsylvania followed
suit."' In 1790, Pennsylvania ratified a new constitution containing the following
double jeopardy clause: "No person shall, for the same offence, be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb."264
In addition to statutes and constitutional provisions recognizing a protection
against double jeopardy, several colonies and, after independence, states also
recognized a prohibition against double jeopardy through case law.265 For example,
Virginia courts acknowledged the English common law pleas of a former conviction,
a former acquittal, and a pardon for the identical crime charged, as well as a plea of
a former attainder for any felony.26' Thus, "[o]n a verdict of not guilty, the prisoner
was forever discharged so far as that particular accusation was concerned. '267 Not
surprisingly, the decisions in the Virginia courts concerning these pleas tended to
follow English precedent. In one case decided in 1735, ajury convicted an individual
for stealing a horse.268 On a motion in arrest ofjudgment, the trial court declared a
mistrial after finding that the order directing the sheriff to assemble a jury to try the
case had been issued to the wrong county.269 The trial court remanded the case for
260 E.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 25 ("The common law of England ... shall remain in
force, unless [it] shall be altered by a future law of the legislature. . . ."); N.J. CONST. of
1776 XXII ("[T]he common law of England... as [has] been heretofore practised in this
Colony, shall still remain in force, until [it] shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature
... ."); N.Y. CONST. of 1777 XXXV ("[T]he common law of England... shall be and
continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of
this State shall, from time to time, make concerning the same."); see also MD. CONST. of
1776, A Declaration of Rights, &C. III ("[T]he inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the
common law of England....").
261 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *335-37.
262 N.H. CONST. OF 1784, Part. I, art. XVI.
263 PA. CONST. OF 1790, art. IX, § 10.
264 Id.
265 See infra notes 266-97.
266 ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 81-82 (1930).
267 Id. at 102.
268 2 VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS: THE REPORTS BY SIR JOHN RANDOLPH AND BY
EDWARD BARRADALL OF DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA 1728-1741, at B50
(R.T. Barton ed., 1909).
269 Id. at B51.
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a new trial before a jury in the proper county.27 0 It concluded that the maxim that
"a Man should not be twice put in Danger of his Life" did not bar a second trial of
the individual for the horse theft because the jury that initially tried the case had no
power to convict the accused.27" ' This result was consistent with that reached in
Vaux's Case,272 in which the Court of King's Bench held that an individual acquit-
ted of an offense charged in an insufficient indictment could be tried for the same
offense under a new indictment because he was never injeopardy under the original
one.
273
New York courts also recognized the defenses of a previous conviction and a
previous acquittal.274 In 1699, a grand jury in New York City charged three men,
Jacob Bratt, Francis Wessells, and William Shakerly, with vending bread of
unlawful assize. 27' Two years earlier, the men had been convicted and fined for
making bread contrary to the laws of New York City.276 The same act apparently
constituted the basis for both charges, for the court dismissed the second charge
because the men "ha[d] been fined before for the same fact. 277 Nearly seventy
years later, George Klock, Jr., was charged in the Supreme Court of New York with
contempt for rescuing his father from the sheriff.278 Klock pleaded autrefoits
convict, and the court discharged him, "[iut appearing to the Court by the Examina-
tion of the Defendant taken in Court on Oath that the Defendant had been indicted
in the Court of... [General Sessions]... for Albany for the Rescue aforesaid and
had been fined the sum of ten pounds for the same and had paid the said Fine. 279
Although judicial records in colonial New York do not show any sign of a plea of
autrefoits acquit, it has been suggested that this "can be attributed to the solicitude
of royal officials that there be no double prosecutions. 280 Such solicitude also may
explain the infrequency of a plea of autrefoits convict.28'
In Connecticut, the courts also recognized a protection against doublejeopardy.
In Hannaball v. Spalding,282 a private individual, Spalding, brought a combined
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 (1591) 76 Eng. Rep. 992, 993 (K.B.).
273 Id.
274 See generally JuLIus GOEBEL, JR., & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT
iN CoLoNIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) 558-59 (1944).
275 Id. at 588.
276 Id.
277 Id. (discussing Minutes of the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the City and
County of New York 1694-1731/32 30, 51, 53).
278 Id. (discussing Minutes of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the Province of New
York 1766-69 (Engrossed Minutes) 504, 505).
279 Id. at 588-89.
280 Id. at 589.
281 Id.
282 1 Root 86 (Conn. 1783).
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criminal prosecution and civil action for damages against Hannaball for the theft of
a handkerchief.283 The county court acquitted Hannaball but subsequently granted
Spalding a new trial on the civil portion of the case on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. At his second trial, Hannaball was found guilty, and the court entered a
judgment against him. The appellate court reversed that judgment, holding that a
prosecutor could not obtain a new trial in a criminal case following the acquittal of
the accused and that a new trial could not be granted on the civil portion only of a
combined criminal prosecution and civil action for damages.28 Four years later,
another appellate court in Connecticut reached a similar result. In Coit v. Geer,2 8' the
court held that an individual who brought a combined criminal prosecution and civil
action for damages for theft could not appeal a verdict of not guilty.2 86 The court
reasoned that "[n]o one is to be twice drawn in jeopardy for the same crime, which
might be the case if this appeal is sustained. ' 87
Pennsylvania courts also recognized a protection against double jeopardy. In
Respublica v. Shaffer, 88 Chief Justice Thomas McKean of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania addressed a grand jury that was considering whether to charge a
particular individual with a criminal offense.289 Chief Justice McKean told the
grand jurors that the defendant could not summon witnesses to testify before the
grand jury on his behalf, explaining that allowing the putative defendant to call
witnesses would turn the grand jury proceeding into a trial, with the grand jury's
decision being tantamount to a verdict of acquittal or guilt.2 90 The Chief Justice
continued: "[T]his would involve us in another difficulty; for, by the law it is
declared that no man shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence: and, yet,
it is certain that the enquiry, now proposed by the Grand Jury, would necessarily
introduce the oppression of a double trial."'2 9'
The courts in South Carolina also seemed to grant individuals some protection
against double jeopardy. In Steel v. Roach,92 a qui tam action, the Attorney General,
at the request of a private party, filed an information alleging that the claimant of the
cargo of a ship violated the revenue laws by unloading the cargo before obtaining a
permit or paying the duty and by unloading before sunrise. 93 The defendant obtained
a verdict in his favor after which a motion for a new trial was made. 94 The court
283 Id.
284 Id. at 87.
285 1 Kirby 269 (Conn. 1787).
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 236 (1788).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 237.
291 Id.
292 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 63 (1788).
293 Id. at 63-64.
294 Id. at 64.
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denied the motion "upon the ground of [the action] being a qui tam orpenal action."29
This language seems to recognize the principle against doublejeopardy, but the report
of the case then adds that, in these kinds of penal actions, "the Court will seldom grant
a new trial."'2 96 This latter statement raises the question whether a court could order
a new trial after a verdict for the defendant in a qui tam action.297
IV. THE ADOPTION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
As originally submitted by the Constitutional Convention to the states for
ratification, the Constitution of the United States did not contain a bill of rights. Its
failure to do so created an outcry from the populace.2 9 President George
Washington, in his Inaugural Address to Congress, mentioned the widespread call
for amendments to the Constitution.2 99 Thomas Jefferson, in a series of letters he
wrote to his political mentor and intimate friend James Madison - the "father of
the Constitution""° - demanded that a bill of rights be added.3' In a number of
states, ratification of the Constitution occurred only after its supporters at the
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 The Supreme Court has never decided whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to
qui tam actions. In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), method of analysis
disavowed by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), the Court stated:
We express no opinion as to whether a qui tam action.., is properly
characterized as a suit between private parties for purposes of [the] rule
[that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered
by litigation between private parties]. In contrast to the plaintiff in a
private-attorney-general action, the private party in a qui tam action
brings suit in the name of the [government] and shares with the
[g]overnment any proceeds of the action.... In [United States ex rel.
Marcus v.] Hess, [317 U.S. 537 (1943),] the Court assumed but did not
decide that a qui tam action could give rise to double jeopardy. Since
this assumption was not essential to the judgment in Hess, we consider
the issue unresolved.
Id. at 451 n.ll.
298 IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 39 (1965); EDWARD
DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 9 (Greenwood Press 1979)
(1957); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32 (1999).
299 George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), in 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
27-29 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
300 See IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800
(1950); see also DUMBAULD, supra note 298, at 21; LEVY, supra note 298, at 34.
301 DUMBAULD, supra note 298, at 8-9; see also LEVY, supra note 298, at 32-34; 2
FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONsTrrUIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 212-13
(1901).
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ratifying convention assured hesitant delegates that a bill of rights would be added
to the Constitution in the form of subsequent amendments.3 °2 George Mason and
Elbridge Gerry, two of the framers of the Constitution, relied partly upon the lack
of a bill of rights as a ground to oppose ratification of the Constitution.0 3 To be
sure, many of those clamoring for a bill of rights viewed the proposed Constitution
as too great an infringement on the sovereignty of the individual states and actually
opposed ratification of the Constitution on that ground.30" Yet, their expressions of
alarm would not have received a favorable response from the masses of people
unless the citizenry felt genuine concern about the absence of a bill of rights.30 5
The First Congress convened on March 4, 1789. On May 4, Representative
James Madison of Virginia gave notice to the House of Representatives that on May
25, he intended to raise the subject of amendments to the Constitution.30 6 He did
not do so on that date,30 7 but on June 8, he introduced a series of proposed amend-
ments, including all those that ultimately became the Bill of Rights.3"' One of those
proposals was the forerunner of the Double Jeopardy Clause.3" Madison proposed
that "[n]o person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one
punishment or one trial for the same offence....""0 Madison may have taken this
prohibition against double jeopardy from a statement in the prefatory declaration
of rights contained in the New York act ratifying the Constitution: 3 ' "[N]o Person
ought to be put twice in Jeopardy of Life or Limb for one and the same Offence,
nor, unless in case of impeachment, be punished more than once for the same
Offence. 3 12 Alternatively, Madison may have been influenced by an amendment
recommended by a special committee appointed by the Maryland convention
302 LEVY, supra note 298, at 31-32.
303 BRANT, supra note 298, at 39.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 257 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
307 Id. at 425-26.
308 Id, at 450-53.
'09 Id. at 451-52.
310 Id, The Congressional Register and two contemporary newspapers printed this proposal
with slightly different punctuation than the version printed in the Annals of Congress. In the
former versions, a comma separates the words "one punishment" from the words "or one
trial." See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
297 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. It is unclear which
of these versions is accurate. It should be noted, however, that the Annals of Congress,
formally titled The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, were not
published contemporaneously. Rather, they were compiledbetween 1834 and 1856, primarily
from newspaper accounts. Speeches in the Annals are not presented verbatim, but are
paraphrased.
311 DUMBAULD, supra note 298, at 53.
312 Reprinted in id. at 190. See also COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 310, at 308.
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following its ratification of the Constitution. 3 The majority of that committee
recommended the addition to the Constitution of a provision stating that "there be
no ... second trial after acquittal .. "' Madison also may have considered
Blackstone's statement that it was a "universal maxim of the common law of
England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once for
the same offence. 315
Whatever the source of Madison's proposal concerning double jeopardy, the
House of Representatives referred Madison's proposed amendments to a Committee
of the Whole on the state of the Union.31 6 Six weeks later, on July 21, Madison
sought to have the House go into a Committee of the Whole to consider the
proposed amendments.3t 7 The House instead referred them to a Select Committee
"to consist of a member from each State"318 and instructed the Select Committee "to
take the subject of amendments to the constitution.., generally into their consid-
eration, and to report thereupon... ,"319 On July 28, Representative John Vining
of Delaware, a member of the Select Committee, "made a report, which was ordered
to lie on the table. 32°
The House of Representatives, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, eventually
considered the proposed amendments to the Constitution on August 13.321 Four
days later, it debated the clause prohibiting double jeopardy, which, as reported by
the Select Committee, then read: "No person shall be subject, [except] in case of
impeachment, to more than one trial or one punishment for the same offence
... ,322 Representative Egbert Benson of New York opposed this proposed
amendment "in the manner it stood., 32 3 He claimed that the meaning of this clause
"appeared rather doubtful" '324 and asserted that its language prohibiting more than
one trial for the same offense contradicted established law.32s Representative
Benson presumed that the clause intended to express the guarantee that no man's
life should be put in jeopardy more than once for the same offense, but pointed out
that an individual was entitled to more than one trial for the same offense. 326 He
313 DUMBAULD, supra note 298, at 53.
314 Reprinted in id. at 177. See also CoMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 310, at 308.
3 " DUMBAULD, supra note 298, at 53 n.8.
316 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 468 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
311 Id. at 685-86.
318 Id. at 690.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 699.
321 Id. at 734.




326 Id. at 781-82.
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noted that the "humane" '327 objective of a guarantee against double jeopardy was to
prevent more than one punishment for a single offense.328 For that reason, he
moved to amend the clause by striking the words "one trial or." '329
Representative Roger Sherman of Connecticut agreed with Benson.3 ' Sherman
thought that the courts would never think of trying and punishing an individual twice
for the same offense and that a person acquitted in his first trial should not be tried a
second time.33' He argued, however, that an individual convicted in his first trial
should be entitled to a second trial if prejudicial error infected his initial trial.332 As
the clause stood, Sherman contended, it deprived such a person of that opportunity.333
Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire spoke in favor of the
proposed amendment. 34 He thought the clause was "essential" and that it declared
the current state of the law.335 He asserted that striking the words "one trial or," as
proposed by Representative Benson, would imply that the House intended to change
the current law and expose an individual to the danger of more than one trial for the
same offense.33 6 He noted that in many cases, a guilty person obtains an acquittal
because the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove his guilt and
that in such cases, both in Great Britain and the United States, the individual cannot
be tried again for the same offense. 37 Accordingly, Livermore argued, the clause
was proper as originally proposed.338
Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts sided with Benson.339 He
proclaimed that instead of securing the liberty of an individual, the clause would
abridge the privileges of those accused of a crime. 40 Nevertheless, Benson's
motion "lost by a considerable majority."34'
Representative George Partridge of Massachusetts then moved to amend the
proposal by inserting the words "by any law of the United States" after the words
"same offence." '342 That amendment "lost also. 343
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On August 19, the House of Representatives began considering the proposed
amendments as reported by the Committee of the Whole.3" On August 21, the House
adopted the proposed amendment concerning double jeopardy345 and the next day
referred it and the other proposed amendments it had adopted to a committee
consisting of Representatives Benson, Sherman, and Sedgwick, "who were directed
to arrange the said amendments and make report thereof." " The committee arranged
the proposed articles of amendment, and on August 24, the House enacted a resolution
to send the proposed amendments to the States for ratification.347 The House then sent
the proposed articles of amendment to the Senate for its concurrence.348
The Senate took up the proposed amendments to the Constitution on September
2.14' Two days later, it considered the clause dealing with double jeopardy.35 It
struck the words "except in case of impeachment, to more than one trial, or one
punishment,"35' and in its place substituted the phrase "be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb by any public prosecution. 352
The source of the Senate's language is uncertain.353 The word "jeopardy" appears
only eleven times in reports of criminal cases in the Year Books, which covered the
period from about 1290 to 1535, and in only three of these instances was the word
used in the statement that a man's life should not be "put in jeopardy" twice for the
same offense.3"' Several American courts used the word prior to the First Congress.355
In addition, as indicated above,356 a prefatory declaration of rights contained in the
New York act ratifying the Constitution provided that "no Person ought to be put
twice in Jeopardy of Life or Limb for one and the same Offence .... 357
3"d. at 795.
3" H.J. 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1789). Unlike the official version, the version included
in a House Pamphlet contains a comma between the words "one trial" and the words "or one
punishment." See COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 310, at 300.
346 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 808 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
347 Id. at 809.
348 Id.
149 S.J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 69 (1789). The proposed amendments, as passed by the
House, were initially read in the Senate on August 25. Id. at 63-64.
350 Id. at 71.
311 Id. As it appears in the Senate Journal, the punctuation in the proposed amendment on
double jeopardy differs slightly from the version that appears in the House Journal: in the
former, a comma separates the words "one trial" from the words "or one punishment." Id. at
64. The latter is missing the comma. H.J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 85 (1789).
352 S.J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1789).
313 The Senate's sessions were not open to the public at this time. Consequently, there are
no reports of the Senate debates on the proposed amendments that became the Bill of Rights.
3' Kirk, supra note 166, at 604-05. Kirk concluded that "although the word 'jeopardy'
began early to have some legal significance, it was not originally connected with the maxim
that a man's life cannot twice be jeopardized for the same offense." Id. at 605.
355 See supra text accompanying notes 285-91.
356 See supra text accompanying note 311.
317 Reprinted in DUMBAULD, supra note 298, at 190. See also COMPLETE BILLOF RIGHTS,
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Nevertheless, there appears to be no clear indication that the word "jeopardy"
(or, for that matter, the phrase "double jeopardy") was a legal term of art in the
eighteenth century.358 Neither Samuel Johnson's 1755 dictionary3 59 nor Giles
Jacob's 1772 law dictionary3 60 define the word.3 6' Noah Webster's dictionary,
which was published in 1828, nearly forty years after the First Congress, defines
"jeopardy" as "[e]xposure to death, loss or injury; hazard; danger; peril. 3 62 It is
therefore possible that the Senate intended the word "jeopardy" to mean "risk,"
"danger," or "peril. '"363
The term "life or limb" also does not appear in eighteenth and early nineteenth
century dictionaries.3 6 Some believe that the phrase was a term of art at the time
of the adoption of the Double Jeopardy Clause and that it is highly probable that the
drafters of the Clause intended it to refer only to crimes punishable as felonies.365
Others believe that, to the drafters of the Clause, "to be in 'jeopardy of life or limb'
meant to be in jeopardy of capital punishment., 366
supra note 310, at 308.
311 OFFICE OF LEGALPOLICY, U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINALJUSTICE REPORT
No. 6, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND GOVERNMENT
APPEALS OF ACQUITTALS (1987), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 831,841 n.7 (1989)
[hereinafter REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL].
319 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan
1755) [hereinafter JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY].
360 GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed., London, W. Strahan 1772).
361 REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 358, at 841.
362 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York,
S. Converse 1828) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY]; REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, supra note 358, at 841. The word "jeopardy" derives from the "Frenchjue-perdre,
a game that one might lose, and the Middle English iuparti, an uncertain game." Amar &
Marcus, supra note 2, at 55.
363 REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 358, at 841. The Supreme Court
subsequently adopted this interpretation. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975), the
Court stated: "Jeopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk
that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution." See also Price v. Georgia, 398
U.S. 323, 326 (1970) ("The 'twice in jeopardy' language of the Constitution... relates to
a potential, i. e., [sic] the risk that an accused for a second time will be convicted of the 'same
offense' .... "); id. at 331 ("The Double Jeopardy Clause... is cast in terms of the risk or
hazard of trial and conviction....").
364 REPORT TO THE ATORNEY GENERAL, supra note 358, at 841. Webster defined the
noun "limb" as "an extremity of the human body; a member;.., as the arm or leg," and the
verb "to limb" as "[t]o dismember; to tear off the limbs." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra
note 362. Johnson defined "limb" as "a member," and "to limb" as "[t]o tear asunder."
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 359.
365 REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 358, at 842.
366 Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., The Case ofEx Parte Lange (or How the Double Jeopardy
Clause Lost Its "Life or Limb"), 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 54 (1999). The Supreme Court
held in Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), that the Double Jeopardy Clause
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Whatever the source of the language of its amendment, on September 9, 1789, the
Senate eliminated the words "by any public prosecution" and, afterj oining the amended
clause with several other clauses, approved the following proposed amendment dealing
with double jeopardy: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... "367 The House of Representatives agreed to
the Senate's version of the proposed amendment, 36 8 and after the Senate on September
25 agreed to several changes in other proposed amendments,369 Congress submitted the
proposal to the States for ratification.37° The Double Jeopardy Clause became part of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution following its ratification by the States in
1791.
extends its protection to all criminal offenses. Referring to the maxim that "no man shall
more than once be placed in peril of legal penalties upon the same accusation," upon which
the common law pleas of autrefoits acquit and autrefoits convict - as well as the Double
Jeopardy Clause itself- are based, the Court explained:
If we reflect that at the time this maxim came into existence almost
every offence was punished with death or other punishment touching
the person, and that [the] pleas [of autrefoits acquit and autrefoits
convict] are now held valid in felonies, minor crimes, and misde-
meanors alike, and on the difficulty of deciding when a statute under
modem systems does or does not describe a felony when it defines and
punishes an offence, we shall see ample reason for holding that the
principle intended to be asserted by the constitutional provision
[against double jeopardy] must be applied to all cases where a second
punishment is attempted to be inflicted for the same offence by judicial
sentence.
Id. at 173. Judge Limbaugh, like the Report to the Attorney General, see supra note 358, at
862 n. 108 and accompanying text, concludes that the Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted
the clause in Lange. Limbaugh, supra, at 61. He concedes, however, that it is too late in the
day to adopt the literal meaning intended by the Framers. Id. He suggests instead that the
Supreme Court acknowledge the error of Lange and redraw the double jeopardy line between
felonies and misdemeanors. Such a line, he contends, is the one "most faithful to the
Constitution (or more properly, least unfaithful)." Id. at 86. Akhil Reed Amar, on the other
hand, agrees with the Supreme Court's decision in Lange. Akhil Reed Amar, Double
Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1810 (1997). He claims that the phrase
"life or limb" should be taken "as a vivid and poetic metaphor for all criminal punishment."
Id.
367 Senate Pamphlet reprinted in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 310, at 303. The
Senate Journal shows that the proposed clause provided: "[N]or shall any person be subject
to be put in jeopardy of life or limb, for the same offence ... ." S.J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 77
(1789).
368 H.J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 121 (1789).
369 S.J., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 88 (1789).
370 1 Stat. 98 (1789).
371 U.S. CONST. amend. V. A protection against double jeopardy was made part of the
French constitution of 1791. See Wilfley, supra note 171, at 424. The Napoleonic Code of
Criminal Procedure published in 1808 also recognized the principle. Article 360 of that Code
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IV. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN
STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The provisions of the Bill of Rights originally placed restrictions only upon the
federal government;372 they were "not directed to the States. 373 As a result, the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit a state from
placing an individual in jeopardy twice for the same offense.374
In 1868, following the Civil War, the States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution.375 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of that Amendment
prohibits a state from "mak[ing] or enforc[ing] any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States," while the Due Process Clause
of that Amendment forbids a state from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... Soon after the ratification of the
provided: "No person legally acquitted can be a second time arrested or accused by reason
of the same act." Id.
372 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); accord Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 51 (1947).
373 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,322 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
31 Id.; Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424,426 (1953), overruled in part by Benton,
395 U.S. 784. Many states, of course, extended protection against double jeopardy to indi-
viduals under their state constitution, e.g., DEL. CONST. OF 1792 art. I, § 8 ("[N]o person shall
be for the same offence twice put in jeopardy of life or limb... ."); N.H. CONST. OF 1784
part I, art. XVI ("No person shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal, for the same crime
or offence."); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6 ("No person shall be subject to be twice put injeopardy
for the same offense.... ."); PA. CONST. OF 1790 art. IX, § 10 ("No person shall, for the same
offence, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."); R.I. CONST. OF 1842, art. 1, § 7 ("[N]o
person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy."); WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 9 ("No person shall.., be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."), or through
their common law, e.g., State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414,418-19 (1829); Gilpin v. State, 121
A. 354, 355 (Md. 1923); Commonwealth v. McCan, 178 N.E. 633, 634 (Mass. 1931); State
v. Clemmons, 176 S.E. 760, 761 (N.C. 1934); State v. O'Brien, 170 A. 98, 100 (Vt. 1934).
In his dissenting opinion in Brock, Chief Justice Vinson stated: "The Constitutions of all but
five states, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont, contain
clauses forbidding double jeopardy. And each of those five states has the prohibition against
double jeopardy as part of its common law." Brock, 344 U.S. at 435 (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). See also Benton, 395 U.S. at 795 ("Today, every State
incorporates some form of the prohibition in its constitution or common law.") (citation
omitted). See generally SIGLER, supra note 10, at 78-83.
371 15 Stat. 706, 707 (1868).
376 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
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Fourteenth Amendment, the question arose whether either of these clauses incor-
porated the Bill of Rights and made its provisions applicable to the States. Early
on, the Supreme Court rejected the view that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was "intended as a protection to the citizen of a State against the legislative power
of his own State," '377 and it therefore held that this clause did not incorporate the
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 378 The Court subsequently reached the same result
concerning the Due Process Clause, 37 9 despite the insistence over the years of a
number of individual Justices, most notably Justice Hugo L. Black. In his dissent-
ing opinion in Adamson v. California,380 Justice Black maintained that the Clause
fully incorporated the provisions of the Bill of Rights.38'
The Supreme Court did, however, hold that due process of law encompassed
those rights - whether or not included in the specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights - that are "fundamental,"3 2 or, as the Court put it in Palko v. Connecticut,3 3
that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. '314 Under this test, the Court
held that several guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights applied to the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right
to counsel in capital cases,385 the right to a public trial,386 and the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures (albeit not the exclusionary rule).387 For the
most part, though, the Court refused to hold that various other rights guaranteed to
those accused of criminal conduct applied to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Hurtado v. California, for example, the
Court held that due process of law does not require a grand jury indictment to
institute serious criminal charges against an individual,388 and in Twining v. New
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
... Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872).
378 Id. at 78; see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98-99 (1908).
"9 E.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,124-27 (1959); Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
26 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46,53-54 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937); Twining, 211 U.S.
at 99.
380 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
381 Id. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 163
(1968) (Black, J., concurring); Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39 (Black, J., concurring); Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
382 Twining, 211 U.S. at 98.
383 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
31 Id. at 325. See also Wolf 338 U.S. at 27; Adamson, 332 U.S. at 54.
385 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
386 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
387 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28, 33.
388 110U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
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Jersey it held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not so fundamental as
to be required by due process of law.38 9 The Court reached the same result in Betts
v. Brady concerning the right to counsel, holding that due process does not require
a state to appoint counsel to represent indigents accused of committing felonies.39
The issue whether due process of law protects an individual against double
jeopardy was first presented to the Supreme Court in 1902 in Dreyer v. Illinois.39 '
In that case, Edward Dreyer, the former treasurer of the West Chicago park commis-
sioners, contended that the State of Illinois placed him in jeopardy twice for the
same offense when it retried him for failing to turn over funds and other personal
property to his successor in office after his first trial for that offense ended in a
mistrial because the jury could not agree upon a verdict.3 92 The Supreme Court did
not, however, consider the merits of Dreyer's claim.393 Instead, the Court held that
even if the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment embraced the
guarantee against double jeopardy, Dreyer's retrial following a hung jury did not
place him in jeopardy twice for the same offense.394
The Supreme Court next faced the issue in Palko v. Connecticut.39 5 The State
of Connecticut charged Frank Palko with murder in the first degree.396 A jury
convicted him of murder in the second degree, and the trial judge sentenced him to
life imprisonment. 397 The State, acting pursuant to a state statute and with the
permission of the trial judge, appealed.398 It claimed that the judge committed a
number of errors of law prejudicial to the prosecution, including erroneously
instructing the jury concerning the difference between first-degree murder and
second-degree murder.399 The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors reversed
Palko's conviction and ordered that he be tried again for murder in the first
degree.400 Prior to his retrial, Palko claimed that the new trial would place him in
jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.40'
The trial judge rejected Palko's claim, and the trial proceeded.4 2 This time the jury
389 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
390 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
391 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
392 Id. at 73.
393 Id. at 85-86.
" Id. (relying on United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824)).
'9' 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
396 Id. at 320-21.
397 Id.
398 Id. at321.
'99 State v. Palko, 186 A. 657, 660 (Conn. 1936).
400 Id. at 662.
401 Palko, 302 U.S. at 321-22.
402 Id. at321.
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convicted Palko of first-degree murder and the trial judge sentenced him to the
punishment of death.40 3
In an opinion written by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Supreme Court, with
only a single justice dissenting, concluded that Palko's second trial did not deprive
him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.41 Cardozo acknowl-
edged that a "closely divided"40 5 Court in Kepner v. United States.6 held that the
prohibition against double jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amendment forbids
putting an individual injeopardy a second time, not only in a different case, but also
in the same case if the new jeopardy was at the insistence of the government and
not the accused.40 7 Nevertheless, after reviewing its previous decisions concerning
the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that the rights encompassed
by due process of law, and hence applicable against the States, were those "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."4"8 The Court stated that the right must be such
that abolishing it would "violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ... [N]either liberty
nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed."4 9  Allowing the government to
appeal errors of law, the Court decided, would neither subject an accused to "a
hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it,"'41 nor "violate
those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions. " The Court reasoned:
The state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude
of cases with accumulated trials. It asks no more than this, that
the case against him shall go on until there shall be a trial free
from the corrosion of substantial legal error. This is not cruelty
at all, nor even vexation in any immoderate degree. If the trial
had been infected with error adverse to the accused, there might
have been review at his instance, and as often as necessary to
purge the vicious taint. A reciprocal privilege, subject at all times
to the discretion of the presiding judge, has now been granted to
403 Id. at 321-22.
Id. at 328.
405 Id. at 322.
4m 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
40' Palko, 302 U.S. at 322-23.
408 Id. at 325.
4 Id. at 325-26 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
410 Id. at 328.
411 Id. (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
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the state. There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of
justice stands, its symmetry, to many, greater than before.412
Indeed, earlier in its opinion, the Court stated that the dissenting opinions in Kepner
show how much could be said in favor of a ruling in that case that the Fifth Amendment
does not forbid putting an individual in jeopardy in the same case if the new jeopardy
is following a successful appeal by the government.413 The Court continued:
Right-minded men, as we learn from those opinions, could
reasonably, even if mistakenly, believe that a second trial'was
lawful in prosecutions subject to the Fifth Amendment, if it was
all in the same case. Even more plainly, right-minded men could
reasonably believe that in espousing that conclusion they were not
favoring a practice repugnant to the conscience of mankind.4
Sixteen years later, in Brock v. North Carolina,415 the Supreme Court again
faced the question whether due process protects an individual against double
jeopardy. In that case, the State of North Carolina charged Brock and two others
involved in a labor dispute with firing shots into a house from a passing auto-
mobile.4 6 The government tried the others first and obtained convictions for assault
with a deadly weapon.417 At Brock's separate trial, the government called his two
alleged accomplices to corroborate the testimony of its other witnesses.41 8 Each of
the alleged accomplices represented to the trial judge that he intended to appeal his
conviction and invoked his privilege against self-incrimination.419 Upon their
refusal to testify, the trial judge declared a mistrial.42" After the Supreme Court of
North Carolina affirmed the convictions of Brock's alleged accomplices, the
government brought Brock to trial a second time.421' Brock objected, claiming that
a new trial would place him in jeopardy a second time for the same offense and
thereby deny him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 422 The trial
court overruled the objection, and Brock was tried, convicted, and sentenced to two
412 Id.
411 Id. at 322-23.
414 Id. at 323.
415 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
416 Id. at 424.




421 Id. at 425-26.
422 Id. at 426.
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years imprisonment.423 The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Brock's
conviction.
414
On certiorari, the State argued that the second trial did not place Brock twice
in jeopardy for the same offense "because the trial court has the discretion to
declare a mistrial and require the defendant to be presented before another jury if
it be in the interest of justice to do so."425 The Supreme Court of the United States
agreed, holding that the second trial did not deny Brock due process of law.426 As
in Palko, the Court concluded that the second trial did not subject the accused to "a
hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it"427 and that it did
not "violate those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions.'"428 The Court stated that under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it had "long favored the rule of discretion
in the trial judge to declare a mistrial and to require another panel to try the
defendant if the ends of justice will be best served." '42 9 The Court continued:
"[A] trial can be discontinued when particular circumstances
manifest a necessity for so doing, and when failure to discon-
tinue would defeat the ends ofjustice." Justice to either or both
parties may indicate to the wise discretion of the trial judge that
he declare a mistrial and require the defendant to stand trial
before another jury. As in all cases involving what is or is not
due process, so in this case, no hard and fast rule can be laid
down. The pattern of due process is picked out in the facts and
circumstances of each case. The pattern here, long in use in
North Carolina, does not deny the fundamental essentials of a
trial, "the very essence of a scheme of ordered justice," which
is due process.430
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court altered its approach concerning the
relationship between the Bill of Rights and the requirement of due process of law.
Beginning with Mapp v. Ohio,431 the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment selectively incorporates various provisions of the first eight
423 id.
424 State v. Brock, 67 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. 1951).
425 Brock, 344 U.S. at 426.
426 Id. at 427-28.
427 Id. at 427 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937)).
421 Id. (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 328).
429 Id.
430 Id. at 427-28 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949)).
431 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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amendments and makes them fully applicable to the States.432 Under this approach, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,433 the Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment,434 the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel,435 the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,436 the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses,4" the Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial,438 the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses,439 and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury,"0 apply in state criminal
prosecutions. The Court in Duncan v. Louisiana"' explained the Court's new test for
determining whether a particular provision of the Bill of Rights is "incorporated" into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
The recent cases.., have proceeded upon the valid assumption
that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical
schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic
of the common-law system that has been developing contempo-
raneously in England and in this country. The question thus is
whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is
fundamental - whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty."2
In 1969, the Supreme Court faced the question whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the double jeopardy provision of the
Fifth Amendment." 3 In Benton v. Maryland, the State of Maryland charged John
Benton with the crimes of burglary and larceny.' 4 A jury found him not guilty of
the larceny charge but convicted him on the burglary charge, for which the trial
judge sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment.445 After the trial, however, it was
432 Id. at 655-60 (holding that the Fourth Amendment is fully applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164 (1968)
(Black, J., concurring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,409 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
413 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-57.
434 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
43' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
436 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
437 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
438 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
439 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1968).
4 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
44' 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
442 Id. at 149 n.14.
443 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
444 Id. at 785.
44 Id.
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determined that both the grand jury that indicted Benton and the jury that tried him
had been unlawfully selected."6 The trial court gave Benton the option of accepting
the conviction or demanding re-indictment and retrial." 7 Benton chose to have his
conviction set aside, and the State again charged him with both larceny and
burglary." Benton moved to dismiss the larceny charge, arguing that because the
first jury acquitted him of that crime, retrial would unconstitutionally place him in
jeopardy twice for the same offense." 9 The trial judge denied the motion, and trial
proceeded on both charges.45 This time, the jury convicted Benton of both larceny
and burglary, and the trial judge sentenced him to a total of fifteen years in
prison.45'
Overruling its decision in Palko v. Connecticut,452 the Supreme Court held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the States through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 453 The Court began its analysis by noting that in
recent years it had "increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the [Bill of
Rights] to determine whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process
of law,'"54 and that "[i]n an increasing number of cases, [it] ha[d] rejected the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down,
subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights. ... "5" The
Court continued:
Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that
basic constitutional rights can be denied by the States as long as
the totality of the circumstances does not disclose a denial of
"fundamental fairness." Once it is decided that a particular Bill
of Rights guarantee is "fundamental to the American scheme of
446 Id. at 786.
447 Id.
448 Id. The government can retry a convicted defendant who has his conviction set aside
on the basis of "trial error" without running afoul of the double jeopardy provision. Lockhart
v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400,402-04 (1987); United
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 (1971); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425-26
(1960); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
" Benton, 395 U.S. at 786.
450 Id.
451 Id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed Benton's conviction, and the
Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari. Benton v. State, 232 A.2d 541 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1967), cert. denied, 248 Md. 733 (1967).
452 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton, 395 U.S. 784.
453 Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
41 Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967)) (brackets in original).
455 Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton
v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960))).
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justice," the same constitutional standards apply against both the
State and Federal Governments.456
The Court then concluded that the protection against doublejeopardy contained in the
Fifth Amendment "represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage.""
It stated:
The fundamental nature of the guarantee against double
jeopardy can hardly be doubted. Its origins can be traced to
Greek and Roman times, and it became established in the
common law of England long before this Nation's independ-
ence. As with many other elements of the common law, it was
carried into the jurisprudence of this Country through the
medium of Blackstone, who codified the doctrine in his Com-
mentaries. "[T]he plea of autrefoits acquit, or a former acquit-
tal," he wrote "is grounded on this universal maxim of the
common law of England, that no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence."
Today, every State incorporates some form of the prohibition in
its constitution or common law .... Th[e] underlying notion
[that the state should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense] has from the
very beginning been part of our constitutional tradition.... [I]t
is clearly "fundamental to the American scheme of justice."458
456 Id. at 795 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
417 Id. at 794.
458 Id. at 795-96 (citation and footnotes omitted) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84,
at *335, and Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149). Judging the validity of Benton's larceny conviction
by federal double jeopardy standards, the Supreme Court held that that conviction could not
stand. Id. at 796. Benton's initial acquittal of larceny barred his second trial because under
the Court's holding in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1957), the State of
Maryland could not condition Benton's appeal of his burglary conviction upon his coerced
surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on the larceny charge. Benton, 395 U.S. at
796-97. Moreover, Benton was placed in "jeopardy" for larceny at his first trial, despite the
defect in the original indictment. Id. At most, reasoned the Court, the defect rendered that
indictment "voidable," not "void." Id. at 797.
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CONCLUSION
Although the precise origins of the guarantee against double jeopardy cannot
be pinpointed, it is clear that it began developing thousands of years ago. Evidence
shows that ancient Jewish law recognized the principle in some form, as did early
Greek law, classical Roman law, and canon law. After being introduced into the
common law of England at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the principle
slowly took root there and developed into the pleas of autrefoits acquit, autrefoits
convict, and pardon. By the time the Bill of Rights was added to the United States
Constitution in 1791, the principle that a person's life ought not to be placed in
jeopardy more than once for the same offense constituted a "universal maxim of
the common law." '459 Today, in the United States, the guarantee against double
jeopardy is deemed a "fundamental" 0 right, and the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment protects a person from being twice placed in jeopardy by
either the federal government or a state.
459 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *335.
460 Benton, 395 U.S. at 795.
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